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Papua Monitor Q1 2026: No de-escalation as military operations drive new displacement

1) Papua Monitor Q1 2026: No de-escalation as military operations drive new displacement

Human Rights NewsReports / IndonesiaWest Papua / 8 May 2026 

This 11-page report lists cases and developments including human rights violations and their patterns; developments in the armed conflict and its impact on civilians; significant political shifts in Indonesia affecting West Papua; and international responses and initiatives.

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Summary

Human rights

The human rights situation between January and March 2026 remains dire. The reporting period was characterised by a significant rise in documented cases of arbitrary detention and torture. There are two major patterns in this trend. First, HRM observed a significant rise in arbitrary detentions in conflict zones, particularly in the Dekai District of Yahukimo Regency. Yahukimo has already become the top hotspot of armed violence throughout 2025 with 35 armed clashes, and ten such incidents between January and March 2026. Security forces targeted indigenous Papuans, mostly young adults, including females and minors. Most of them were released the following day without being charged. Intensified patrols and raids further contribute to this trend, with security forces applying interrogation methods that violate Indonesian criminal procedure and human rights law.

Second, a significant number of these arbitrary detentions were reportedly accompanied by torture. Officials used coercive and violent measures to extract information about the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) or to force confessions from detainees. These developments took place alongside ongoing military operations in the regencies Intan Jaya and Puncak, reportedly involving battle drones, mortars and air strikes in civilian populated areas across the central highlands. As a result, the number of internally displaced persons continues to rise (see section on Conflict below).

Indigenous communities are more than ever at risk of losing their land as a result of ruthless economic development projects and the expansion of security force infrastructure in West Papua. In the South Papua Province, the Strategic National Project (PSN) for the development of more than 2 million hectares of sugar cane and rice is rapidly being implemented by the military, while legal efforts and protests by customary landowners are ongoing. Since late 2024, a growing body of evidence has documented serious procedural violations, the dismantling of indigenous land rights, incidents of violence against community members who resist, and the systematic exclusion of affected communities from decision-making processes.

In the Biak Numfor Regency of Papua Province, state agencies have launched a systematic land-grabbing campaign across the regencies of Biak Numfor, Supiori, and Waropen. In the Impewer area of East Biak District, a major land dispute has erupted over plans to construct the headquarters for Infantry Battalion TP 858/MSB. The Warbon Indigenous Community of Saukobye Village in North Biak faces a separate but related threat from the planned construction of a national spaceport by the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN). 

Various incidents during the reporting period illustrate the shortcomings in Indonesia’s legal system. Many court decisions in West Papua often appear to be politically motivated rather than being based on criminal procedure, evidence and facts at court. Moreover, high impunity for state agents has caused the loss of trust in the law enforcement system among many Indonesians. This trust is even lower in the Papuan Provinces, as a recent incident illustrates. On 2 February 2026, Second Brigadier Fernando Alexander Aufa, one of the convicted officers involved in the killing of Tobis Silak in August 2024, was seen walking freely in Wamena. The incident raised serious concerns that Officer Aufa may have been released despite a five-year imprisonment sentence. Despite constant setbacks, NGOs pursued efforts to push for an accountability process for cases of human rights violations through lobby meetings with political stakeholders such as the Regional Representative Council in Jakarta in February 2026.

Various documented cases between January and March 2026 highlight the systemic failures in the healthcare system in West Papua. Issues of concern reportedly includ the misuse of public health infrastructure, the absence of basic services in geographically isolated communities, the prioritisation of administrative procedures over emergency care, and the compounding impact of armed conflict on health services. In this regard, Southwest Papua Senator Paul Finsen Mayor interrupted a Regional Representatives Council (DPD) plenary meeting in Jakarta on 14 January 2026 to deliver a pointed message from the Papuan people. Senator Mayor spoke out against the Indonesian government’s plans to establish new territorial development battalions in West Papua, emphasising that basic services rather than military infrastructure should be the priority for the special autonomous region.  

Conflict

There is no sign of de-escalation in sight. The Indonesian government kept deploying additional military personnel to remote areas across West Papua, fueling armed conflict and triggering more internal displacements.  An unknown number of indigenous Papuans were internally displaced due to armed conflict incidents and subsequent raids in the Boven Digoel Regency in February 2026.

The military operations in the central highlands reportedly involved the use of battle drones, mortars and air raids in civilian populated areas, violating principles of distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Recurring armed violence and heavy military presence have resulted in the cessation of daily activities and paralysation of health and education services across conflict-affected regencies. Such patterns cause fear among local communities and encourage the civilian population to flee to safer areas. As of 27 March 2026, armed conflict and military operations in West Papua have resulted in the internal displacement of more than 107,039 civilians across multiple regencies.

In response to escalating militarisation, civil society groups across West Papua have mobilised in peaceful protests, demanding an end to military operations and the withdrawal of non-organic troops. Between late October and early November 2025, demonstrations had already taken place in Nabire, Enarotali, Sugapa, and Jayapura. Further protests against the rising militarisation in West Papua occurred in the regencies Pegunungan Bintang, Intan Jaya and Yahukimo in January 2026. Another protest took place in the Nabire Regency in February 2026. While civil society groups, church leaders, and human rights organisations are united in calling for an immediate halt to military operations, demilitarisation, and meaningful engagement in a peaceful dialogue, the central government shows no signs of refraining from a security-based approach in West Papua.

HRM documented 35 armed attacks and clashes throughout the first quarter of 2026, a smaller number than that of the fourth quarter of 2025, counting 41 clashes. The majority of armed hostilities during the reporting period occurred in Yahukimo, with 10 armed clashes and attacks, followed by the Puncak Regency with 6 armed clashes. Armed hostilities were also documented from the regencies of Intan Jaya, Nabire, Puncak, and Mimika. Isolated incidents of armed violence occurred in the regencies Tambrauw, Maybrat, Paniai, Nduga, Boven Digoel, Tolikara, and Dogiyai.

HRM counted 13 civilians killed and 4 injured by the TPNPB. Meanwhile, 5 civilians were killed, and 4 were wounded by security force members during armed clashes or counter-insurgency operations. Concerning the combatants, 9 security force members were killed, and 2 were injured during this period. In contrast, the TPNPB reportedly lost 5 combatants, with 4 guerrilla fighters being injured during armed clashes.

Comprehensive data on armed conflict violence in West Papua is available in the HRM Annual Report 2025, published in March 2026.

Political developments

On 2 January 2026, Indonesia enacted its new Criminal Code (KUHP) and Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP), prompting a coalition of civil society organisations to declare an “Indonesian legal emergency.” The new law has drawn sharp criticism from legal experts, human rights defenders, and historians. Among the most troubling provisions in the new KUHP are restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly. The code also increases the maximum punishment for treason from life imprisonment to the death penalty. Perhaps most alarming, Article 622 explicitly repeals key provisions of Law Number 26/2000 on Human Rights Courts, effectively eliminating criminal accountability for gross human rights violations.  

On 13 and 14 January 2026, Indonesian Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka visited West Papua to review development projects, beginning in Biak Numfor before travelling to Wamena, where he played in a friendly football match, met with regional leaders and community figures, and engaged with local coffee farmers and creative economy practitioners. His planned second-day visit to Yahukimo Regency was cancelled following intelligence assessments that identified armed group movements in the area. The TPNPB had fired shots at an aircraft in the region and issued a threat to kill the VP if he travelled to Yahukimo.

On 6 February 2026, President Prabowo and Australian PM Anthony Albanese signed a bilateral defence treaty, first announced in Nov 2025, signalling deepening security cooperation. The Prime Minister announced several new initiatives to further enhance the bilateral security relationship, including supporting the development of joint defence training facilities in Indonesia, establishing a new embedded position for a senior Indonesian military officer in the Australian Defence Force, and building ties between future military leaders through the expansion of the Junior Leaders’ Forum Military Education Exchange. On 12 March 2026, Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin announced plans, alongside Australia, to pursue separate trilateral security arrangements with Japan and Papua New Guinea.

In February 2026, the Indonesian government and Freeport-McMoRan (FCX) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to extend the mining permit for the Grasberg complex in the Mimika Regency, Central Papua Province, beyond 2041. The agreement secured a 12% additional stake for Indonesia by 2041 and includes a ~$20 billion investment to sustain long-term operations.

International developments

On 20 February 2026, various Special Rapporteurs oft he UN Human Rights Council issued a formal communication to the Indonesian Government concerning the draft Presidential Regulation (“Regulation”) on the Duties of the Indonesian National Army in Combating Terrorist Acts. The UN experts represent the view that the manner in which the Regulation would expand the role of the military in countering terrorism in peacetime would bring serious risks to human rights, the rule of law, and Indonesian civil society.

Christian Solidarity International (CSI) called on the Indonesian government to grant international observers access to West Papua, warning that ongoing military operations in the region are driving a mounting humanitarian crisis. Speaking in an oral statement at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva on 25 March 2026, CSI expressed concerns over the increasing number of indigenous Papuans who have been internally displaced by the armed conflict. According to CSI, the military operations are closely linked to large-scale resource extraction projects involving nickel, gold, and industrial plantations. CSI is calling on the government to facilitate a visit by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and to extend invitations to relevant UN special procedures.

CSI’s statement echoed calls made at a UN Human Rights Council side event on 4 March 2026, hosted by the World Council of Churches (WCC), which was also attended by a representative of the Indonesian government. The WCC urged the Indonesian government to “extend invitations to the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council and to facilitate a visit by the High Commissioner for Human Rights.”

A new documentary, Pesta Babi (Pig Feast), premiered at the West Papua Forum in Auckland on 7 March 2026. The documentary highlights the devastating impact of Indonesian development projects on indigenous Papuan communities.

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An acid test of Indonesia’s democracy 

May 10, 2026

A military police person, far left, escorts Indonesian military personnel, from left, Sami Lakka, Nandala Dwi Prasetya, Budhi Hariyanto Widhi Cahyono, and Edi Sudarko, accused of an acid attack on human right activist Andrie Yunus, during trial at a military court in Jakarta, Indonesia, Wednesday, April 29, 2026. (AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana)

An acid attack by four Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) soldiers on a human rights activist highlights growing tensions as President Prabowo reinstates military influence in Indonesia’s civilian administration.  

Is Indonesia using state-sanctioned violence to crush critics of its administration of the world’s third-largest democracy? Since a revolution at the end of the last century, it claims to have thrown off a 32-year autocracy led by former general Soeharto. But the replacement government, now run by Soeharto’s former son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto, is a “flawed democracy” according to the London-based Economic Intelligence Unit.

Arousing most concern are laws to put the military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) in control of systems and departments previously run by civilians. NGOs have been leading critics of this trend, with one prominent human rights advocate, Andrie Yunus, assaulted in  an acid attack on 12 March 2026 as he left his Central Jakarta office around 11 pm. Yunus is the Deputy Coordinator of the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS) and has been an outspoken critic of the return to a military-run state. He had been receiving phone threats but  had still been planning to release research into violence perpetrated by the security forces.

Amnesty International Indonesia collected 295 incidents of intimidation against human rights defenders and labelled 2025 as the Year of Living Dangerously for activists. (The title of the 1978 Christopher Koch book and Peter Weir’s 1982 film retains its relevance and potency.) Acid is often the weapon of choice. It doesn’t go bang and arouse security or upset body scanners; blokes carrying plastic drink bottles rarely arouse suspicion.

Yunus was critical of the TNI’s growing influence, largely through inserting officers into the leadership of government departments that had been handling civilian affairs for almost three decades, since the collapse of Soeharto’s New Order government. Prabowo is a former three-star general sacked in 1998 for allegedly disobeying orders while he was Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command_._ Now as President, he has even put TNI officers in charge of the government’s free-school meal program and its rice control and distribution agency_._

Yunus’s ambushers were four active-duty intelligence officers, who are on trial in a military court, where it is alleged they were motivated by personal revenge to splash his face and clothes with acid. Another version blames Yunus for causing distress in 2025 when he disrupted a hotel meeting of politicians and bureaucrats discussing the revision of the TNI Law. The defendants consider Yunus’s actions had insulted the military.

Researchers for Yunus’s defence have scrutinised security camera tapes of the incident and claim another 10 soldiers were involved as watchouts, making the attack a coordinated affair. A flask of the prepared acid mix was tossed in Yunus’s face, under his helmet and down his overclothes. He was thrown off his machine, screaming in agony, according to witnesses.  Twenty per cent of his body is burnt and he will likely lose his right eye. He is still in hospital.

Prabowo has reportedly said: “This is terrorism, isn’t it? A barbaric act. We must pursue.”  But KontraS is unimpressed by the pledge and angry about the prosecution being held in a military court, even if the proceedings are open to the media.

Yunus has written to the President:

In various cases involving civilians harmed by military personnel, including forced disappearances, killings, torture, and domestic violence, military courts have never delivered justice, accountability, or full institutional responsibility up to the chain of command. This only perpetuates a record of impunity.

This appeal was binned.

Jakarta Military Court chief Colonel Fredy Ferdian Isnartanto has tried to justify keeping the case in his jurisdiction.  He told a press conference:

If this were handled in a civilian court, it would not be appropriate, and the legal process would not proceed. It could even be rejected by the district court.

The track record on prosecutions is not good. Ten years ago, a former policeman turned corruption investigator, Novel Baswedan, was walking home from his local mosque in North Jakarta when two men threw acid at his face. He lost an eye. After more than two years of investigation and a presidential order to find the assailants, the result was a disappointment. Two active police officers were convicted and jailed for a year. Novel’s supporters said they were scapegoats.

The stand-out in the business of removing government critics has to be the 2004 assassination of lawyer Munir Said Thalib, the founder of  KontraS in 1998. He was poisoned on a Garuda flight while heading to Utrecht University to study for a master’s degree in international law and human rights. A post-mortem found arsenic in an orange drink.  He died before landing. The then-President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (another former general) promised Munir’s widow, Suciwati, that the case would be thoroughly investigated.  It wasn’t.

According to the nation’s leading daily, Kompas,

the shadow of the military’s return to dominance in civilian governance is now increasingly apparent. A total of 2,500 active TNI personnel have quietly taken up civilian positions, a figure that exceeds the limits set by law.

If the revision of the TNI Law currently being discussed by the DPR (Parliament) is passed, the last barrier to military involvement in civilian bureaucracy will collapse.

Not only that, but soldiers will also be given the opportunity to engage in business activities, blurring the clear line that has long separated the military from economic and political interests.

The California-based Asia Sentinel magazine has warned of “the darkening face of Indonesia’s democracy” with “reports of intimidation and terror directed at activists, legislative initiatives widely seen as constraining press freedom, and, perhaps most strikingly, the reactivation of military command structures at the regional level”.

How does this affect Australia? Along with the US, in early 2000s, Australia banned Prabowo from visiting on the grounds of his alleged human rights record in Papua and Timor. But in politics, pragmatism usually smothers principles. Prabowo got his visa once he founded his right-wing populist Gerindra (Great Indonesia) party in 2008 and became its candidate for the presidency.

Earlier this year, PM Anthony Albanese visited Jakarta to sign a security deal between the TNI and the ADF, saying, “No country is more important to Australia — or to the prosperity, security and stability of the Indo-Pacific than Indonesia”. No mention of human rights, the rules of warfare and the sharing of values.  Our soldiers mingling with theirs should beware of misunderstandings that could lead to criticisms and cool drink bottles with suspect contents.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.

Duncan Graham 

Duncan Graham has been a journalist for more than 40 years in print, radio and TV. He is the author of People Next Door (UWA Press). He is now writing for the English language media in Indonesia from within Indonesia. Duncan Graham has an MPhil degree, a Walkley Award, two Human Rights Commission awards and other prizes for his radio, TV and print journalism in Australia. He lives in East Java

Police reportedly shot seven students during civil unrest following graduation parade in Kobakma, Mamberamo Tengah Regency

6 May 2026 / 4 minutes of reading

On 5 May 2026, police officers opened fire at protesters and injured at least seven civilians with bullets (see photos and victim table below, source: independent HRDs), most of them senior high school students conducting a parade to celebrate their school graduation in Kobakma, Mamberamo Tengah Regency, Papua Pegunungan Province. The situation allegedly escalated after police officers attempted to stop the group over the display of the Morning Star flag. Spray-painting school uniforms with a Morning Star Symbol is a common practice across West Papua on graduation day. In other parts of West Papua such as Yahukimo, Lanny Jaya and Nabire, the student parades took place without being interfered by authorities (see photos below, source: independent HRD)

According to local sources, students had gathered to celebrate the announcement of their graduation results and marched through Kobakma town. When the procession reached the market area near Arege Road and the police station, police officers reportedly blocked the parade around 11:00 am. A verbal confrontation escalated into a scuffle. Residents who witnessed the incident reportedly objected to the police intervention, after which the situation became increasingly chaotic. Protesters began throwing stones at the police officers, who allegedly responded by firing shots and deploying tear gas to disperse the crowd.

Reports also indicate that at least one police officer sustained serious injuries during the unrest. Security personnel reportedly remained deployed at several strategic locations in Kobakma following the incident. The Deputy Regent of Mamberamo Tengah Regency was expected to meet police officials on 6 May 2026 at the Kobakma Police Station to discuss de-escalation and prevent further violence.

The Morning Star is a symbol of cultural identity for indigenous Papuans. Article 2 of the Papuan Special Autonomy Law (UU Otsus) acknowledges the use of a regional emblem as a symbol of cultural identity if the symbol is not used to compromise the sovereignty of Indonesia. However Indonesian authorities continue criminalising the use of the Morning Star on clothing and accessories. The Papuan independence movement promotes the Morning Star Flag as their National Flag.

Human rights analysis

The incident raises serious concerns regarding the necessity, legality and proportionality of the use of force by law enforcement officials. Even if authorities considered the display of the Morning Star flags unlawful under Indonesian law, the use of firearms against students and civilians requires strict scrutiny. Under international human rights standards, firearms may only be used when strictly unavoidable to protect life.

The incident also raises concerns regarding Indonesia’s obligations under the United Nations Human Rights Committee interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Indonesia is a State Party. The reported use of live ammunition against students and civilians during a public procession may constitute an interference with the rights to life, peaceful assembly and freedom of expression protected under Articles 6, 19 and 21 ICCPR. Even where authorities consider symbols such as the Morning Star flag to be politically sensitive or unlawful under domestic legislation, restrictions on expression and assembly must remain lawful, necessary and proportionate. Under Article 6 ICCPR, law enforcement officials have a heightened duty to protect life and must minimise harm during public order operations. The deployment of firearms in response to a student procession appears difficult to reconcile with the principle that lethal or potentially lethal force may only be used as a measure of last resort where strictly necessary to protect life from an imminent threat.

Furthermore, the reported shooting of minors and young civilians may amount to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if excessive force was used. Indonesia is therefore under an obligation to conduct a prompt, effective, independent and impartial investigation capable of identifying those responsible and ensuring accountability and reparations for the victims.

Table of persons injured by bullets in Kobakma Town on 5 May 2026

NoNameAgeStatus, backgroundAdditional info
1Yali Elabi18Student, Kobakma State High SchoolGunshot wound to right thigh; critical
2Nita Sibak20Female student, Kobakma State High SchoolGunshot wound to left hand
3Sago Pugumis17Male student, from Broges Village, Kobakma DistrictInjured; hospitalised
4Enius Wanimbo22Male student, from KelilaInjured; hospitalised
5Wajus Pagawak24Village youth, from Gimbis Village, Kobakma DistrictInjured; hospitalised
6Abi Yikawa24Civilian, from Dakama Village, Bolakme DistrictInjured; hospitalised
7Nius Wandikbo19Male, from IlukwaInjured; hospitalised

Protesters with gunshot wounds receive medical treatment at the Lukas Enembe Hospital in Mamberamo Tengah Regency, 5 May 2026

Detailed Case Data
Document ID: HRM-CAS-063-2026
Region: Indonesia > Highland Papua > Central Mamberamo > Kobagma
Total number of victims: 7

#Number of VictimsName, DetailsGenderAgeGroup AffiliationViolations
1.Nita Sibak

female20 Indigenous Peoples, Studentill-treatment
2.Yali Elabi

male18 Indigenous Peoples, Studentill-treatment
3.Sago Pugumis

male17 Indigenous Peoples, Studentill-treatment
4.Enius Wanimbo

male22 Indigenous Peoples, Studentill-treatment
5.Wajus Pagawak

male24 Indigenous Peoples, Studentill-treatment
6.Abi Yikawa

male24 Indigenous Peoples, Studentill-treatment
7.Nius Wandikbo

19 Indigenous Peoples, Studentill-treatment

Period of incident: 05/05/2026 – 05/05/2026
Perpetrator: Republic Indonesia > Indonesian Security Forces > Indonesian Police > POLRES
Issues: indigenous peoples, security force violence

Papua prelate’s Indonesian food project stance sparks moral crisis 

Support for state-backed development puts Church at odds with Indigenous Catholics defending ancestral land

By Ryan Dagur Published: April 20, 2026 06:12 AM GMT

For decades, the Catholic Church has presented itself as a moral ally of Indigenous peoples.

From Laudato Si’, in which Pope Francis defended ancestral lands, to Vatican endorsements of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Church has framed the protection of Indigenous communities as a matter of justice, dignity and faith.

That global moral posture makes what is now unfolding in Papua deeply unsettling.

In Indonesia’s easternmost region, a senior Catholic leader is facing fierce opposition from his own congregation for supporting a government-backed food mega-project that threatens Indigenous land.

The controversy erupted after Archbishop Petrus Canisius Mandagi of Merauke warned that Catholics protesting the project would “perish.” His comment ignited outrage among Papuan Catholics and exposed a profound contradiction between the Church’s teachings and its actions on the ground.

In Papua — a region long scarred by land dispossession, militarization and resource extraction — the Church’s stance is never merely theological. It is political, moral and deeply consequential.

Mandagi’s words force an unavoidable question: Will the Church in Papua live up to its global teachings by standing with Indigenous communities defending their ancestral land, or will it align itself with state power and corporate interests under the banner of development and food security?

The archbishop’s remarks were delivered during a church inauguration Mass on April 6, in response to peaceful weekly protests led by lay Catholics opposing his support for a massive food estate designated by Jakarta as a national strategic project.

“God destroys those who do not respect places of worship,” Mandagi told them.

For many Papuan Catholics, the statement felt less like spiritual guidance than a threat — one issued from the pulpit against those invoking their faith to defend their land and livelihoods.

The backlash was immediate. Expressions of pain and anger flooded social media as lay Catholics accused the archbishop of silencing dissent rather than shepherding his flock.

Yet the furor did not arise overnight. Since 2024, Mandagi’s vocal endorsement of the project has prompted sustained protests demanding that he withdraw his support and apologize.

Rather than easing tensions, his latest remarks have widened the rift, transforming internal disagreement into an open moral confrontation.

At the heart of the dispute is a government food project that aims to clear up to 3 million hectares of land in Merauke — two-thirds for sugarcane and the rest for rice. The administration of Prabowo Subianto has presented the initiative as essential to Indonesia’s food sovereignty.

But the land is far from empty. It is the ancestral territory of the Malind, Maklew, Khimaima and Yei peoples — forested wetlands where life depends on sago groves, rivers and seasonal hunting.

More than 50,000 Indigenous residents across 40 villages are expected to be affected. Deforestation is already underway. By the end of 2025, nearly 6,000 hectares had been cleared for rice cultivation, while sugarcane plantations destroyed more than 15,000 hectares in early 2026 alone.

Each hectare lost represents not only environmental damage but also the erosion of Indigenous food systems, culture and collective memory.

While urban Catholic youth stage demonstrations inside churches, Indigenous communities have mounted their own form of resistance.

Across Merauke, villagers have planted red crosses — salib merah — on land earmarked for clearing, asserting ownership and erecting a spiritual barrier against destruction.

The symbolism is striking: Catholic imagery deployed by Indigenous people themselves, yet without the backing of the Church’s hierarchy.

Rather than listening to these concerns, Mandagi has suggested that protesters are being manipulated by vested interests. What has been conspicuously absent is any public acknowledgment of the harm the project poses to his own congregants.

His background — he is not Papuan, but from North Sulawesi — has further fueled criticism, prompting growing calls for the Vatican to appoint an Indigenous Papuan archbishop.

These demands are not merely symbolic. In recent years, Papuan-born bishops have emerged as some of the strongest moral voices opposing land grabs and militarization.

Bishop Bernardus Bofitwos Baru of Timika, for example, has repeatedly described food estate projects as existential threats to Indigenous communities. 

His stance aligns closely with Papua’s Protestant churches, which have long opposed land dispossession. In February, the Communion of Churches in Indonesia — which includes 105 denominations — formally condemned land seizures carried out in the name of food security at the conclusion of its assembly session in Merauke.

The controversy also recalls the failure of an earlier mega-project: the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate, launched in 2010 and eventually abandoned after widespread displacement and ecological damage.

At the time, under Archbishop Nicolaus Adi Seputra, the archdiocese’s Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation office actively supported community resistance.

The contrast with Mandagi’s leadership is stark. Shortly after his appointment, in January 2021, he signed a memorandum of understanding with a palm oil company linked to the controversial Korindo Group to renovate a seminary — without meaningful consultation with local communities.

The dangers posed by the current project extend far beyond land loss.

In 2025, Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission identified at least five areas of concern: land rights, environmental health, food security, participation in decision-making and personal security.

Militarization is the most acute threat. Troops have been deployed to secure project sites, with military posts established near Indigenous villages.

In 2025, a battalion was stationed inside a company concession on the ancestral land of the Kwipalo clan from the Yei tribal group without consent. When villagers blocked excavators, they faced police reports and threats of criminal charges.

The United Nations has also raised the alarm. In March 2025, nine UN special rapporteurs warned Indonesia of alleged land grabbing, forced evictions, deforestation and military repression linked to the project.

The pattern is familiar: sweeping promises of food security, land acquisition enforced by armed force and the displacement of Indigenous peoples — echoing colonial plantation models rather than participatory development.

It is here that the Church in Papua stands at a crossroads.

One path prioritizes harmony with state power, reframes Indigenous resistance as disorder and recasts dispossession as progress — risking the erosion of decades of moral authority.

The other is grounded in Catholic social teaching: standing with communities whose land, culture and survival are under threat.

The Papuan Catholics who protest week after week are not enemies of the Church. They are its conscience

The question is whether the Church hierarchy will heed that call — or allow the words uttered from the pulpit to define its legacy.

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official editorial position of UCA News.

Dispossession, violence, and resistance: The human rights crisis around the Merauke National Strategic Project

Human Rights News / IndonesiaWest Papua / 15 April 2026 

In the forests and villages of Merauke Regency, South Papua Province, a quiet but intensifying crisis is unfolding. Indonesia’s National Strategic Project (Proyek Strategis Nasional, or PSN), an ambitious state-backed programme encompassing rice field development, a 135-kilometre access road, sugarcane plantations for bioethanol, and food self-sufficiency schemes, is colliding with the lives, lands, and rights of the Malind and other indigenous Papuan groups who have inhabited this region for generations.

Since late 2024, a growing body of evidence has documented serious procedural violations, the dismantling of indigenous land rights, incidents of violence against community members who resist, and the systematic exclusion of affected communities from decision-making processes. Legal challenges are now working their way through the Indonesian courts, while civil society organisations, churches, and human rights advocates have raised increasingly urgent calls for the government to halt the project and respect its obligations under national and international law.

The situation in Merauke is a stark illustration of the human costs of large-scale development projects that are pursued without adequate legal safeguards, meaningful community participation, or respect for indigenous rights. The communities who have lived in and stewarded these forests for generations are not opposed to development as such; they are opposed to development that destroys their homes, eliminates their food sources, and is imposed upon them without consultation or consent.

This article summarises the key developments from early 2026 and sets out the principal human rights concerns arising from the implementation of the PSN in Merauke.

Background: What is the Merauke PSN?

The Merauke PSN is a cluster of large-scale development programmes formally designated as National Strategic Projects under the administration of President Prabowo Subianto for the 2024–2029 term. The centrepiece is the construction of a 135-kilometre road connecting Wanam Village in Ilwayab District to Selauw Village in Muting District, intended to serve as infrastructure for a food and energy security programme.

The PSN includes a rice field development programme in Ilwayab District, implemented by Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence in collaboration with PT Jhonlin Group, a company owned by South Kalimantan entrepreneur Andi Syamsuddin Arsyad (widely known as Haji Isam). Other important components of the project are the sugarcane cultivation for bioethanol, a biogas project, and an agricultural land optimisation scheme. The programmes covers land in three regencies of south Papua Province, namely Merauke, Boven Digoel, and Mappi.

According to Suara Papua and Yamenadi, hundreds of excavators arrived at the Merauke port on 13 March 2026. (see video below, source: independent HRD) Reports suggest PT Jhonlin Group intends to bring additional of 2,000 excavators to the region to accelerate the programme. The scale of the operation signals the government’s determination to press forward regardless of ongoing legal challenges and community opposition.

Procedural violations: Building without a permit

One of the most legally significant findings to emerge from investigations by civil society groups is that the construction of the 135-kilometre road began approximately one year before the required environmental permit was issued.

According to the Merauke Solidarity legal advocacy team, land clearing for the road began in September 2024. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) decision (Merauke Regent’s Decree No. 100.3.3.2/1105/2025) was only issued in September 2025. This means that for roughly twelve months, construction proceeded without any valid environmental authorisation, a clear violation of Article 22(1) of Law No. 32 of 2009 on Environmental Protection and Management. Legal advocates argue that the permit effectively sought to retroactively legitimise activities that had already taken place illegally.

The Papua Human Rights Coalition, in a statement published on 18 March 2026, further noted that the absence of an EIA also means the project proceeded without a valid business licence, since under Article 24 of Law No. 6 of 2023 on Job Creation, the EIA serves as the mandatory basis for determining environmental feasibility prior to any licence being granted. The coalition argues that the project may therefore have violated Article 109 of the same law, which sets out environmental offences.

Advocates have also raised concerns about the financial implications of these procedural irregularities. According to the lawyers, the delayed issuance of the permit is suspected of being designed to allow state budget funds to reimburse private parties who had been financing construction costs. This practice raises potential corruption concerns. According to records from the Pusaka Bentala Rakyat Foundation cited in the same report, land clearing had by that point covered 56 kilometres of the planned route.

Reclassification of 486,939 hectares forest without consent

In January 2026, further alarm was raised when two decisions issued by the Minister of Forestry (Decrees No. 591 and No. 430 of 2025) came to the attention of civil society groups. These decisions reclassify 486,939 hectares of forest area in South Papua Province as non-forest land, intended to support the national food, energy, and water self-sufficiency programmes.

Critically, the decisions were never made public. However, the Merauke Solidarity Advocacy team was able to obtain copies by filing a formal public information request, receiving the documents on 13 January 2026. The affected indigenous communities in Merauke and Boven Digoel Regencies were neither informed nor consulted. The communities’ formal administrative objection, filed on 10 February 2026.

The free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) principle ensures that indigenous communities be meaningfully consulted before decisions affecting their lands are made. It is not only enshrined in international human rights law, but also in Indonesian law, including Articles 43 and 44 of Law No. 2 of 2021 on Special Autonomy, Article 6 of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, and Constitutional Court Decision No. 35/PUU-X/2012, which confirms that customary forests are not state forests.

The consequences for affected communities are profound. Among those acutely affected is the Wambon Kenemopte tribe of Boven Digoel, whose eight clans had submitted a formal application for recognition of their customary forest as early as September 2023, with assistance from the Pusaka Foundation. While they were still working to fulfil the documentation requirements requested by the Ministry of Forestry, the Minister issued the reclassification decree, changing the status of their forest to non-forest land earmarked for oil palm cultivation.

On 10 February 2026, twelve representatives of indigenous communities from Boven Digoel and Merauke lodged a formal administrative appeal against the two ministerial decisions, demanding their revocation and calling for concrete steps towards the recognition of indigenous Papuan land rights.

Violence against the Kamuyen Clan: A community under attack

Among the most disturbing developments in early 2026 have been the attacks on Esau Kamuyen, head of the Kamuyen clan in Nakias Village, Ngguti District, and his family. The Kamuyen clan is one of several clans in Merauke whose customary land falls within the planned route of the 135-kilometre road. Unlike some neighbouring clans, Esau Kamuyen has consistently refused to relinquish his community’s land.

As far back as 8 October 2025, the Kamuyen clan erected red crosses on their territory as a traditional symbol of prohibition (see photo on top, source: independent HRD), blocking access to their customary land and demanding a halt to all activities by PT Jhonlin Group, which had already begun clearing the forest. According to investigations by LBH Papua Merauke, the clan’s forest had been forcibly cleared by contractors despite their explicit objections.

The attacks on the family began on 23 January 2026. A group of people reportedly set fire to a temporary forest shelter used as a resting place (see top left photo below, source: independent HRD). Mr Norton Kamuyen, was struck with the blunt side of a machete and threatened. The following night, on 24 January, a larger group, believed to include residents from Yodom Village and Nakias Village, mounted a more serious attack on Mr Esau Kamuyen’s home. The attackers were armed with axes, machetes, spears, arrows, and air rifles. Arrows and spears were fired at the house; one spear became lodged in the wall.

Outnumbered, Mr Kamuyen and his family fled their home to seek refuge in another village. The attackers entered the house, ransacked and damaged household property, and stole the motorbike (see photos above, source: independent HRD). The motorcycle was later found in another village. The violence was followed by threats of further assault and murder delivered via text messages, as well as a written declaration from several customary leaders affiliated with the attacking group threatening further action if authorities and other parties did not meet their demands within 72 hours.

Solidarity Merauke’s investigations suggest the attackers are residents from four villages who hold opposing views to the Kamuyen clan on the question of releasing customary land for the road construction. Civil society groups attribute the violence directly to the pressures generated by the PSN and the approaches taken by the project’s implementers to secure land access.

On 14 February 2026, accompanied by LBH Papua Merauke, Mr Esau Kamuyen formally filed a police report (reference number LP/B/39/II/2026/SPKT/Res Merauke/Polda Papua). However, the intimidations did not end there. On 3 March 2026, members of the Kamuyen clan patrolling their territory discovered that the red crosses had been removed by unknown persons and replaced with a piece of wood wrapped in yellow palm fronds resembling a traditional ritual object from the Marind community. LBH Papua Merauke characterised this act as part of a systematic effort to undermine the Kamuyen clan’s resistance and provoke intra-community conflict.

Legal challenges

Following the mounting pressure, indigenous communities and their legal representatives have pursued an active legal strategy, filing challenges at multiple levels of Indonesia’s administrative and judicial system. On 5 March 2026, five representatives of the Malind indigenous community filed a lawsuit at the Administrative Court (PTUN) in Jayapura, formally challenging the environmental feasibility permit for the 135-kilometre road. The plaintiffs represent the Balagaize, Mahuze, Moyuwend, Basik-Basik, and Gebze clans. The case is registered under number 9/G/LH/2026/PTUN Jayapura.

The filing was accompanied by a solidarity demonstration at the court in Jayapura’s Waena district, where the plaintiffs were joined by students and civil society representatives. Before entering the court building, the plaintiffs held a traditional prayer ceremony during which they daubed their bodies in white clay as a symbol of grief over the destruction of their ancestral forests.

The first hearing took place on 31 March 2026.  A second hearing followed on 14 April 2026, at which judges requested amendments and clarifications to the lawsuit, including strengthening arguments around climate change impacts. The road construction was confirmed to still be ongoing at the time of the hearings. A next hearing was scheduled for 21 April 2026. The Papua Human Rights Coalition, in a statement published 18 March 2026, urged President Prabowo and the Minister of Defence to halt all construction pending the court’s ruling on environmental feasibility.

At the national level, civil society groups have also initiated a judicial review at the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi), challenging provisions in the Job Creation Law that facilitate PSN designation and implementation.

Voices of resistance: Church, civil society, and indigenous communities

The resistance to the Merauke PSN has drawn support from a broad coalition of actors beyond the directly affected communities. In late January and early February 2026, the Indonesian Council of Churches (PGI) held its Full Workers’ Council (MPL) session in Merauke, providing a prominent platform for community voices. Following the session, PGI General Chair Rev Jacklevyn Manuputty issued a statement strongly condemning military expansion and PSN implementation in Papua, describing these as tools of state oppression and a continuation of internal colonialism. The PGI further called for an end to militarism and authoritarianism, and urged President Prabowo to engage in dialogue with affected communities.

LBH Papua Merauke and the Merauke Solidarity Group welcomed the PGI statement, calling on President Prabowo to halt the PSN and withdraw security forces from project sites in Wanam and other locations, noting that the presence of armed TNI personnel has generated fear among communities already under pressure.

Indonesian Police Go on Killing Spree, as Crackdown Escalates in West Papua  

BY PAUL GREGOIRE PUBLISHED ON 11 APR 2026

Members of the occupying Indonesian police went on a murderous rampage in the West Papuan village of Moanemani, located in Dogiyai Regency at around 10 am on 31 March 2026, which involved officers firing randomly into a local marketplace, prior to the police assault shifting to neighbouring Ikebo village, where officers started indiscriminately shooting upon Papuan houses.

The number of people injured is unknown, however, five West Papuans were shot dead. The Indonesian police commenced applying collective punishment to the villagers of Moanemani and Ikebo, after the body of a murdered police officer, who was an Indigenous West Papuan, was found in front of Ebenezer Church in Moanemani. And no one is sure who killed the officer.

This callous attack on villagers comes at a time when Indonesian president Prabowo Subianto has been cracking down on West Papuans within their own Melanesian homelands, particularly in the regencies of Yahukimo, Intan Jaya, Paniai, Maybrat, and now Dogiyai. This marks an escalation of attacks on villages that commenced in Nduga regency in 2018, under the former Jokowi government.

Indonesia commenced administering West Papua in 1963, following the former Netherlands colonisers exiting and the UN brokering a deal, which was to permit the West Papuans to hold a referendum on independence. But in seeking to maintain control of the resource rich region, Indonesia held a 1969 vote where 1,026 Papuans voted to remain with Jakarta at gun point.

The recent random shootings on the part of Indonesian police reveals the circumstances that West Papuans have lived under since the 1960s, and the escalation in violence against the locals is in keeping with a Prabowo presidency, as the former Suharto-era army general earnt himself a reputation for perpetrating war crimes against the East Timorese and West Papuans.

Escalating occupier aggression

Footage of the recent incident supplied by the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), shows armed and heavily uniformed Indonesian police emerging from a police van and chasing unarmed West Papuan civilians deeper into a residential area, shots can be heard and buildings can be seen ablaze in the distance.

Those gunned down and killed, included 19-year-old Siprianus Tibakoto, 20-year-old Yosep You, 60-year-old Ester Pigai, who suffered from paralysis, along with 14-year-old Martinus Yobee and 19-year-old Angkian Edowai. And on 1 April, 14-year-old Maikel Waine and 11-year-old Maikel Pekei continued to be in a critical condition, after being shot by Indonesian police.

“Indonesia’s actions in Dogiyai are both a crime against humanity – a grave act of colonial violence – and a breach of international law,” insisted West Papuan provisional government president Benny Wenda. “Shooting indiscriminately into homes and a public market is a form of collective punishment, while the intentional killing of civilians is a war crime.”

This latest incident comes after Jakarta had been dropping bombs upon a makeshift refugee camp in Puncak’s Kembru District, causing West Papuans, who were already displaced to have to relocate once more. And there are currently 105,000 West Papuan villagers displaced in the highlands, due to the ongoing attacks on these unarmed people living in the planet’s third largest rainforest.

“What the carnage in Dogiyai demonstrates is that Indonesia views all West Papuans as legitimate targets,” Wenda further set out. “Elders, women, and children: no one is safe from the murderous vengeance of the Indonesian security state. The massacre triggered a wave of internal displacement, as terrified civilians fled into the mountains and surrounding villages.”

EU priorities profit over rights

A key issue for West Papua achieving its independence is due to the reluctance of other nations to raise the issue of the occupied Melanesian peoples, so as to not rock the boat with Jakarta. And Wenda recently pointed to the International Parliamentarians for West Papua (IPWP) analysis of the September 2025 established EU–Indonesia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as an example.

IPWP considers that in signing off on the FTA, the European Union has effectively approved the ongoing environmental destruction and rights abuses caused by Indonesia in the Melanesian region. The West Papuan environment and its people’s rights were not considered during negotiations, yet a fair amount of LNG, palm oil and metals are sourced from West Papua by EU nations.

Prabowo first paid a visit to West Papau after becoming president in November 2024, with a key part of his tour being a visit to Merauke district, which is the site of the world’s largest deforestation project, with the clearing of an eventual 2 million hectares set to take place in order to facilitate giant sugarcane plantations.

In its assessment of the EU-Indonesia FTA, IPWP pointed out that the sustainability impact assessment of the free trade agreement with Indonesia made no mention of West Papua whatsoever, and this is while unprecedented deforestation and environmental destruction are being perpetrated in the Melanesian region.

The IPWP further charged the EU with failing to take the plight of the West Papuan people into any consideration when finalising the trade agreement. The parliamentarians pointed to the fraudulent 1969 UN-brokered referendum, which saw a little over 1,000 Papuans vote to stay with Indonesia, and they wondered why this was not an issue for European negotiators.

United in denial of self-determination

Wenda questioned in February, why, despite the fact that Indonesia has been carrying out attacks on unarmed West Papuan villages for coming on eight years now, Indonesia’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Sidharto Reza Suryodipuro, was appointed to the position of president of the UN Human Rights Council in January.

The UN was further presented with a copy of the West Papuan People’s Petition back in 2019. This is a document that calls upon the UN to facilitate a new and legitimate vote on self-determination. The petition has been signed by 1.8 million West Papuans, or 70 percent of that Indigenous population. And yet, there has been no movement on this issue ever since.

“I reiterate our demand for Indonesia to allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit West Papua,” said Wenda, who has been exiled from his homeland for decades. “Over 110 countries – a clear majority of the UN member states – have now demanded this visit, but Indonesia continues to refuse.”

“Dogiyai is not an isolated incident: every day brings a new atrocity,” the president of the West Papuan provisional government in waiting made clear in ending.

“How long will the world allow this to continue before Indonesia is made to suffer genuine diplomatic consequences for their refusal?”

PAUL GREGOIRE 

Paul Gregoire is a Sydney-based journalist and writer. He’s the winner of the 2021 NSW Council for Civil Liberties Award For Excellence In Civil Liberties Journalism. Prior to Sydney Criminal Lawyers®, Paul wrote for VICE and was the news editor at Sydney’s City Hub.

The humanitarian cost of Indonesia’s refusal to allow a UN Human Rights visit to West Papua 

Indonesia has refused the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights access to West Papua since 2019. This round-up details the human rights abuses Indonesia has committed in West Papua during that time. 
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The ULMWP urges world leaders to renew the outstanding demand for UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visit to West Papua, in the wake of the Dogiyai massacre of six West Papuans, including two minors, by the Indonesian police.

Since 2019, 111 UN member states – a clear majority of the UN General Assembly – have demanded a visit to West Papua by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The first of these demands was made in August 2019 by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), who labelled West Papua ‘the festering human rights sore’ of the Pacific region. Despite this pressure, Indonesia has consistently and deliberately blocked UN access to West Papua.

More than six years have passed since the initial state-level demand for a UN visit was made. To underscore the urgency of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visit, the ULMWP has provided a breakdown of how the human rights situation in West Papua has deteriorated since 2019.

Displacement:

  • At least 107,039 West Papuans are currently displaced by Indonesian military operations – perhaps one in fifteen West Papuans has been a refugee since 2019;
  • More than 20,000 West Papuans were displaced in 2025 alone;
  • A minimum of 1110 West Papuans have died as a result of internal displacement, from disease, malnutrition, or as a result of inadequate medical facilities;
  • Only localised or temporary returns home have been documented, such as 353 returnees in Maybrat in 2022;
  • Some IDPs have been displaced more than once, such as 900+ in Intan Jaya who were forced to leave their homes a second time in mid-2025;
  • Indonesia has at times bombed makeshift refugee camps in West Papua, including in Puncak in February 2026.

Extra-judicial killings:

  • It is impossible to verify the true number of West Papuans killed by Indonesian security forces, due to Indonesia’s strict media and NGO reporting ban, and routine misinformation spread by the Indonesian state in the wake of killings;
  • However, it is likely that at least 653 West Papuans have been killed since December 2018 (the numbers below are minimum estimates);
    • 2019: 278
    • 2020-2021: 93
    • 2022: 33
    • 2023: 81
    • 2024: 40
    • 2025-2026: 128 so far
  • Mass killings are common and accountability is effectively non-existent. Emblematic mass killings during this period include:
  • Fifteen civilians massacred in Soanggama village, Intan Jaya, in October 2025;
  • Up to fifteen civilians executed during a military raid in Intan Jaya in May 2025;
  • ‘Bloody Wamena’: Ten Papuans murdered by security forces (pictured above) in Wamena in February 2023;
  • Ten Papuan civilians massacred in Yahukimo and Fakfak in September 2023;
  • Fifteen killed in Kiwirok in 2021.

Militarisation:

  • As of December 2025, at least 83,177 security forces were stationed in West Papua, roughly one for every twenty-two Indigenous Papuans;
  • This figure includes 56,517 soldiers and 26,660 police, but does not include forces temporarily deployed to West Papua from other regions of Indonesia, so the real number is likely to be higher;
  • At least 40,000 additional troops have been deployed to West Papua since 2019;
  • Hundreds of military posts have been established in West Papua during this time; while no hard figure is available for the entire territory, we know that 31 checkpoints were established between July and September 2025 in Intan Jaya alone;
  • Indonesia is using a range of technologically advanced weaponry on West Papuans, including Brazilian‑made EMB‑314 Super Tucano fighter jets, Chinese blowfish drones, and UK-made sniper rifles.

Environmental destruction:
Douglas Gerrard | The World's Largest Deforestation Project

  • Ecocide in occupied West Papua has increased dramatically since 2019, as Indonesia seeks to use West Papua to secure its future food and energy security;
  • Indonesia launched the largest deforestation project in human history in West Papua in 2024 – a 3-million-hectare rice and sugarcane food estate in Merauke (pictured above), since expanded to the entire South Papua Province;
  • The Merauke food estate – covering an area the size of Wales – is set to release an additional 780 million tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere, more than doubling Indonesia’s existing emissions;
  • Wabu Block, a 1.8-million-hectare gold mine in Intan Jaya, has been under construction since 2021, and continues to displace communities and militarise the Papuan highlands;
  • In 2024, BP completed an expansion of its Tangguh gas field in West Papua, which will now supply 35% of Indonesia’s entire gas supply.

Secrecy is the key weapon Indonesia uses to maintain its genocidal and ecocidal rule over West Papua. By keeping its occupation hidden from the world, Indonesia is able to get away with its crimes with near total impunity, while continuing to expropriate West Papua’s huge mineral wealth. Only international intervention, beginning with a UN Human Rights visit, can stop this suffering. Indonesia must face serious diplomatic consequences until the UN High Commissioner access to West Papua is finally allowed to visit West Papua.

IPWP Chair Alex Sobel with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk

Indonesia’s democracy faces a quiet return of military power 

April 10, 2026Signs of renewed military involvement in civilian life are raising concerns that Indonesia may be drifting back towards the authoritarian practices of its past.

Imagine you’ve seen a street skirmish and call the police. A brief chat reveals the brawlers are off-duty soldiers. They continue to throw punches and rocks. The cops drive away.

The policy was dwifungsi (an adopted loanword), and it ran throughout Indonesia during the 32-year authoritarian rule of the second president, Soeharto, a former general.

At the top was the army – at the bottom the police.

Dwifungsi was dismantled during the Reformation in 2000 by the fourth President, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), now deceased.

A liberal Islamic scholar, he understood the importance of restricting the military to defence and separating it from the police role of domestic peacekeeping.

It hasn’t been an easy transition. Turf wars, access to power and rivalries continue.

Khairul Fahmi, a military analyst at the Institute for Security and Strategic Studies_,_ attributed the recurring clashes between the two forces to “institutional arrogance, a culture of superiority, sectoral egotism, and festering jealousies, dynamics that have grown unchecked.

“Much of the rivalry stems from competition for ‘fertile grounds’ of influence across civil society, bureaucracy, and even parliament.”

Stories of inter-service punch-ups had become ho-hum till a street acid-attack last month in Jakarta on prominent human rights activist Andrie Yunus as he left a legal aid office.

He was badly burned on his face, hands, and chest, covering 24 per cent of his body. He’s been in intensive care, and his family is in protection.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Turk, said he was “deeply concerned” with the attack. Four soldiers from an intelligence unit have allegedly been detained, according to military police commander Yusri Nuryanto.

A decade earlier, a former policeman turned corruption investigator, Novel Baswedan, was walking home from his local mosque in North Jakarta when two men threw acid at his face. He lost an eye.

After more than two years of investigation and a presidential order to find the assailants, he was reported as saying the police were “not really serious in handling his case.”

Two active police officers were convicted and jailed for a year. Novel’s supporters said they were scapegoats and the Mr Big had escaped identification.

Inquiries into the March attack on Andrie suggested the two assailants on a motorbike were soldiers and ordered to send a warning to civilian critics of the return of dwifungsi.

  According to the nation’s leading daily, Kompas, “the shadow of the military’s return to dominance in civilian governance is now increasingly apparent. A total of 2,500 active TNI (Military) personnel have quietly taken up civilian positions, a figure that exceeds the limits set by law.

“If the revision of the TNI Law currently being discussed by the DPR (Parliament) is passed, the last barrier to military involvement in civilian bureaucracy will collapse.

“Not only that, but soldiers will also be given the opportunity to engage in business activities, blurring the clear line that has long separated the military from economic and political interests.”

The California-based Asia Sentinel magazine is warning of “the Darkening Face of Indonesia’s Democracy.

“Reports of intimidation and terror directed at activists, legislative initiatives widely seen as constraining press freedom, and, perhaps most strikingly, the reactivation of military command structures at the regional level.

“… these developments evoke the territorial military influence that defined Indonesia’s authoritarian past, raising urgent questions about whether the country is gradually retreating from the democratic gains achieved since 1998.”

The present President Prabowo Subianto is the former son-in-law of the late Soeharto. He’s known to want the military in civil affairs, as soldiers are trained to follow orders and not challenge.

Personal loyalty is critical in the armed forces; fine in a firefight, though not in professional administrations demanding impartiality.

After the acid splash, Prabowo told some selected journos (not this one) that the attack on Andrie Yunus was a “barbaric act of terrorism” that demands a comprehensive investigation into its masterminds.

“This is terrorism. This is a barbaric act. We must pursue it. We must investigate it! We must find out who ordered it, who paid for it.”

He explicitly guaranteed that no “impunity” would be granted if security personnel are found complicit, vowing that legal proceedings will be conducted strictly and impartially.

Sounds like the right response, except this is Indonesia. The two previous incumbents of the Presidential Palace said much the same thing about the most blatant assassination since the Reformation.

In  2004, lawyer Munir Said Thalib, founder of KontraS, the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence, was poisoned on a Garuda flight while heading to Utrecht University to study for a master’s degree in international law and human rights.

A post-mortem found he died from arsenic in an orange drink. He perished before landing. Then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (another former general) promised Munir’s widow, Suciwati, that the assassination would be thoroughly investigated. It wasn’t.

KontraS is struggling to reopen the case, but there’s no political commitment. This is not a time for Indonesian activists to move about unprotected. Correction: It never has been.The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.

Duncan Graham has been a journalist for more than 40 years in print, radio and TV. He is the author of People Next Door (UWA Press). He is now writing for the English language media in Indonesia from within Indonesia. Duncan Graham has an MPhil degree, a Walkley Award, two Human Rights Commission awards and other prizes for his radio, TV and print journalism in Australia. He lives in East Java.

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IIndonesia’s claims of rice self-sufficiency clash with import deals, opaque data and the growing political control of the food system.

Rice isn’t just a meal for half the world. In Indonesia it’s also an essential ingredient in national sovereignty – and big money deals. Mao Zedong was wrong about “all political power growing out of the barrel of a gun.” In Indonesia it grows in the paddy.

Are all Indonesians now dining on their own home-grown rice with not one imported grain, as the government says? If so, it’s a stunning achievement towards self-sufficiency directed by President Prabowo Subianto and a great boost to national pride.

It should also lead to lower prices.

But is it true?

The rice trade is controlled by the State-owned monopoly and public corporation, Bulog, Badan Urusan Logistik (Logistics Affairs Agency). It runs grain depots around the country and sets the floor price, currently Rp 6,500 (AUD 52 cents) a kilo.

Overall Indonesia produces about 55 million tonnes a year and is the world’s fourth largest grower.

Bulog is the principal source of data on crops, plantings and deliveries. It’s an agency with a record of alleged corruption, mainly concerning illegal sales.

This year it “absorbed” the equivalent of 840,000 tonnes of rice – representing a 2,000 per cent increase from the same period last year. This happened despite major flooding, particularly in Sumatra.

Even assuming yields have been boosted by better cultivation, new varieties and fertilisers, this figure is so astonishing that it deserves scrutiny. So far, the Indonesian media and academic researchers have found better meals elsewhere.

Apart from keeping food on the table, there’s another agenda: to manage everything in the food business and put the Prez in charge without waving a weapon.

Bulog, formerly a civilian agency, is now being run by the Army. Major General Ahmad Rizal Ramdhani was appointed last year. He said his job was to “transform the state-owned food company into a major autonomous body directly under the President.

“The hope is that, in line with the President’s wishes, Bulog will return to its former glory, like it did in (the Soeharto era). Bulog shouldn’t just be managing rice, but managing everything, so as to guarantee food self-sufficiency.”

Soeharto, Indonesia’s second president, died in 2008. He was also a former general. For a time his son-in-law was Prabowo.

Last year Ahmad’s predecessor Lieutenant Novi Helmi Prasetya lasted four months as Bulog’s boss. No reason was given for his return to the ranks.

Bulog’s warehouses reportedly hold 2.4 million tonnes, a figure that could rise to three million by the end of the month, potentially marking a new national record. New depots are planned.

The Indonesian NGO Prakarsa (Initiative), “an institution for research and policy advocacy” in Jakarta , reported that in the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed with the US in February, Indonesia had “committed to importing 1,000 tonnes of rice.

“Quantitatively, the figure appears small … however, this commitment has sparked controversy. Indonesia, while claiming a rice surplus, is locking in rice imports from countries that are not major global rice producers.

“This is where the question arises: does the food import commitment in the trade agreement erode the food self-sufficiency and sovereignty that has been touted so far?”

In 2024, Indonesia imported 4.52 million tons of rice, a 47 per cent increase from more than three million tonnes the previous year.

A sudden surplus of more than four million tonnes in 2025 looks curious, particularly when credited to Prabowo during his first year in office.

Former presidents also promised – and failed – to make the nation self-sufficient in foods.

Since 2008, when the population was 240 million, Indonesia has imported rice, mainly from Vietnam and Thailand, to ensure the staple ingredient is always available.

Any dearth could lead to food riots, as at the turn of the century, when the nation’s crops were damaged by the El Niño drought.

The other factor in poor harvests at the time was Krismon – the economic crisis caused by student riots and the dethroning of the autocratic second president, Soeharto.

The population is now 285 million. Land available for cultivating the grain has shrunk as roads, industry, and housing have moved onto the flattest areas in an archipelago of mountains.

According to Indonesia Corruption Watch_,_ Bulog originally served as a food provider and distributor for the people.

“With broader authority, including price stabilisation, supplier selection, and food security, Bulog has become a cash cow. Trillions of rupiah can flow into Bulog at any time.

“Its position as an institution directly under the president allows Bulog to access non-budgetary funds outside the state budget … This makes it difficult for the House of Representatives or the Supreme Audit Agency to access Bulog.

“(Two) former Bulog heads were only able to be investigated after President Soeharto left power. Both were tried and convicted after being found guilty of corruption.

“Bulog had to disburse Rp 40 billion (AUD 3,300) from a non-budgetary account, allegedly for Golkar Party campaign expenses. Bulog will always be a magnet for various political parties and the ruling elite to compete for.”

This month, Bulog claimed its warehouses held 2.4 million tonnes and had enough to start exporting. The often unhusked grain is held in 50 kg sacks and usually has to be lugged on the backs of youths dashing up swaying planks to load trucks. Mechanisation is rare.

It’s then sold to private companies for cleaning, refining and marketing under brands and retailed in five and ten-kilo plastic bags.

During the rule of the first President, Soekarno, Indonesia exported rice with a reputation for high quality. Those glory days are regularly recalled by politicians claiming the nation can be food self-sufficient again.

It has now apparently achieved that goal and given Prabowo’s reputation a big tick.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.

Duncan Graham

Duncan Graham has been a journalist for more than 40 years in print, radio and TV. He is the author of People Next Door (UWA Press). He is now writing for the English language media in Indonesia from within Indonesia. Duncan Graham has an MPhil degree, a Walkley Award, two Human Rights Commission awards and other prizes for his radio, TV and print journalism in Australia. He lives in East Java.

John Menadue

Support our independentndonesia’s rice bowl gets bigger

Alleged destruction of property and intimidation of a Papuan Pastor amid escalating security operations in Dekai, Yahukimo Regency

19 March 2026 / 5 minutes of reading

Between 12 December 2025 and February 2026, a series of incidents of alleged shooting, vandalism, robbery, intimidation and continued harassment were reported at the home of Rev. Victor Kobak in Jalan Gunung, Dekai District, Yahukimo Regency, Papua Pegunungan province. Rev Kobak leads the Evanhastia congregation, belonging to the Evangelical Church in Indonesia (GIDI). The events occurred in the context of security force raids in response to the deteriorating security situation in the Yahukimo Regency. Authorities reacted with intensified military deployments, restrictions on civilian activities and a series of reported arbitrary arrests in Dekai Town. Rev Kobak reportedly suffered material losses, psychological distress and ongoing intimidation, while the wider community experienced heightened fear and insecurity linked to escalating armed conflict dynamics in the area.

Security forces came to Rev Kobak’s house, opening fire at his house, damaging parts of the property, and seizing personnel belongings. On 12 December 2025 joint security forces reportedly opened fire at the house belonging to Rev. Victor Kobak. Bullets struck walls and roof sections at both the front and rear of the building, causing structural damage and material losses. On 22 January 2026, security personnel again entered Rev Kobak’s house without showing a warrant and devastated the interior. The doors were kicked in and damaged. After the house search, personal belongings were missing. On 31 January 2026, security force personnel again came to Rev Kobak’s house, dismantling parts of the house and removing items, including his Starlink communication equipment, four sleeping bags or mats, and work-related equipment. Four doors were dismantled.

Following the circulation of video documentation of the incidents, Rev. Kobak received anonymous threatening phone calls and hostile social media posts in February 2026. The acts of intimidation included attempts to stigmatise him as a member of the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) in social media posts. These actions increased fear for the safety of the Rev Kobak and his family.

Deteriorating security situation and series of arbitrary detentions in Dekai

The harassments and intimidation of Rev Kobak occurred amid a significant escalation of security operations across Yahukimo Regency in early 2026, particularly in the Dekai District. Reports indicate the establishment of additional security presence, expanded patrols and increased surveillance of civilian movement. Statements by security officials during meetings with business operators on 17 February 2026 suggested that civilians remaining in public spaces beyond designated curfew hours could be warned, detained overnight or otherwise subjected to enforcement measures. Such policies reportedly contributed to fears of arbitrary detention, racial profiling and collective stigmatisation of indigenous Papuans as potential supporters or members of armed groups.

The deteriorating situation also had humanitarian consequences. Healthcare workers at the Yahukimo Regional General Hospital and community health centres publicly stated on 20 February 2026 that they felt unsafe while performing their duties amid the presence of armed personnel near medical facilities. They demanded explicit security guarantees from both Indonesian security forces and armed Papuan groups, emphasising their neutral humanitarian role protected under International Humanitarian Law. Reports further indicated temporary closures of healthcare facilities and disruptions to essential services due to security fears, affecting civilian access to medical treatment.

Church leaders similarly expressed alarm at the militarisation of civilian spaces. On 21 February 2026, Rev. Atias Matuan, Chair of the Yahukimo Churches’ Fellowship (PGGY), urged security forces not to station personnel at hospitals, warning that their presence had traumatised patients and undermined public trust in essential services. These developments reflect a broader climate of insecurity in which civilian institutions such as churches, schools and healthcare facilities have become increasingly entangled in conflict dynamics.

Human rights analysis

The reported shooting at a civilian residence, vandalism and removal of property raise concerns regarding arbitrary interference with the home and unlawful destruction of civilian objects, particularly if conducted by state security forces without lawful basis or judicial oversight. Such conduct violates the right to privacy, family life and property, as well as abuses of authority under domestic criminal law.

The intimidation of a religious leader and the dissemination of personal identity data without consent may amount to harassment of a human rights defender and interference with freedom of religion, expression and association. In conflict-affected contexts, religious figures often play key humanitarian and mediation roles; targeting them risks undermining civilian protection mechanisms and community resilience.

More broadly, the imposition of curfews combined with threats of detention for civilians present in public spaces may engage international human rights standards relating to freedom of movement and protection from arbitrary arrest or detention. Where security operations result in the closure of hospitals or intimidation of healthcare workers, this may also violate obligations to respect and protect medical personnel and ensure access to essential services.

Under International Humanitarian Law applicable to non-international armed conflicts, parties must distinguish between civilians and combatants, respect the neutrality of medical personnel and religious institutions, and refrain from pillage or destruction of civilian property unless imperatively required by military necessity. The reported developments in Dekai suggest a shrinking humanitarian space and increasing risks to civilians not directly participating in hostilities.

On 31 January 2026, security personnel again searched Rev Kobak’s house without warrant and devastated the interior

On 12 December 2025 joint security forces reportedly opened fire at the house belonging to Rev. Victor Kobak. The bullets struck walls and the roof.

Social media post accusing Rev Kobak of affiliation with the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB)

Detailed Case Data
Location: Dekai, Yahukimo regency, Highland Papua, Indonesia (-4.8638158, 139.4837298) 
Region: Indonesia, Highland Papua, Yahukimo, Dekai
Total number of victims: 1

#Number of VictimsName, DetailsGenderAgeGroup AffiliationViolations
1.Victor Kobak

maleadult Indigenous Peoplescriminalisation, intimidation

Period of incident: 12/12/2025 – 11/03/2026
Perpetrator: , Indonesian Security Forces
Issues: indigenous peoples, security force violence