Indonesian Police Go on Killing Spree, as Crackdown Escalates in West Papua  

BY PAUL GREGOIRE PUBLISHED ON 11 APR 2026

Members of the occupying Indonesian police went on a murderous rampage in the West Papuan village of Moanemani, located in Dogiyai Regency at around 10 am on 31 March 2026, which involved officers firing randomly into a local marketplace, prior to the police assault shifting to neighbouring Ikebo village, where officers started indiscriminately shooting upon Papuan houses.

The number of people injured is unknown, however, five West Papuans were shot dead. The Indonesian police commenced applying collective punishment to the villagers of Moanemani and Ikebo, after the body of a murdered police officer, who was an Indigenous West Papuan, was found in front of Ebenezer Church in Moanemani. And no one is sure who killed the officer.

This callous attack on villagers comes at a time when Indonesian president Prabowo Subianto has been cracking down on West Papuans within their own Melanesian homelands, particularly in the regencies of Yahukimo, Intan Jaya, Paniai, Maybrat, and now Dogiyai. This marks an escalation of attacks on villages that commenced in Nduga regency in 2018, under the former Jokowi government.

Indonesia commenced administering West Papua in 1963, following the former Netherlands colonisers exiting and the UN brokering a deal, which was to permit the West Papuans to hold a referendum on independence. But in seeking to maintain control of the resource rich region, Indonesia held a 1969 vote where 1,026 Papuans voted to remain with Jakarta at gun point.

The recent random shootings on the part of Indonesian police reveals the circumstances that West Papuans have lived under since the 1960s, and the escalation in violence against the locals is in keeping with a Prabowo presidency, as the former Suharto-era army general earnt himself a reputation for perpetrating war crimes against the East Timorese and West Papuans.

Escalating occupier aggression

Footage of the recent incident supplied by the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), shows armed and heavily uniformed Indonesian police emerging from a police van and chasing unarmed West Papuan civilians deeper into a residential area, shots can be heard and buildings can be seen ablaze in the distance.

Those gunned down and killed, included 19-year-old Siprianus Tibakoto, 20-year-old Yosep You, 60-year-old Ester Pigai, who suffered from paralysis, along with 14-year-old Martinus Yobee and 19-year-old Angkian Edowai. And on 1 April, 14-year-old Maikel Waine and 11-year-old Maikel Pekei continued to be in a critical condition, after being shot by Indonesian police.

“Indonesia’s actions in Dogiyai are both a crime against humanity – a grave act of colonial violence – and a breach of international law,” insisted West Papuan provisional government president Benny Wenda. “Shooting indiscriminately into homes and a public market is a form of collective punishment, while the intentional killing of civilians is a war crime.”

This latest incident comes after Jakarta had been dropping bombs upon a makeshift refugee camp in Puncak’s Kembru District, causing West Papuans, who were already displaced to have to relocate once more. And there are currently 105,000 West Papuan villagers displaced in the highlands, due to the ongoing attacks on these unarmed people living in the planet’s third largest rainforest.

“What the carnage in Dogiyai demonstrates is that Indonesia views all West Papuans as legitimate targets,” Wenda further set out. “Elders, women, and children: no one is safe from the murderous vengeance of the Indonesian security state. The massacre triggered a wave of internal displacement, as terrified civilians fled into the mountains and surrounding villages.”

EU priorities profit over rights

A key issue for West Papua achieving its independence is due to the reluctance of other nations to raise the issue of the occupied Melanesian peoples, so as to not rock the boat with Jakarta. And Wenda recently pointed to the International Parliamentarians for West Papua (IPWP) analysis of the September 2025 established EU–Indonesia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as an example.

IPWP considers that in signing off on the FTA, the European Union has effectively approved the ongoing environmental destruction and rights abuses caused by Indonesia in the Melanesian region. The West Papuan environment and its people’s rights were not considered during negotiations, yet a fair amount of LNG, palm oil and metals are sourced from West Papua by EU nations.

Prabowo first paid a visit to West Papau after becoming president in November 2024, with a key part of his tour being a visit to Merauke district, which is the site of the world’s largest deforestation project, with the clearing of an eventual 2 million hectares set to take place in order to facilitate giant sugarcane plantations.

In its assessment of the EU-Indonesia FTA, IPWP pointed out that the sustainability impact assessment of the free trade agreement with Indonesia made no mention of West Papua whatsoever, and this is while unprecedented deforestation and environmental destruction are being perpetrated in the Melanesian region.

The IPWP further charged the EU with failing to take the plight of the West Papuan people into any consideration when finalising the trade agreement. The parliamentarians pointed to the fraudulent 1969 UN-brokered referendum, which saw a little over 1,000 Papuans vote to stay with Indonesia, and they wondered why this was not an issue for European negotiators.

United in denial of self-determination

Wenda questioned in February, why, despite the fact that Indonesia has been carrying out attacks on unarmed West Papuan villages for coming on eight years now, Indonesia’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Sidharto Reza Suryodipuro, was appointed to the position of president of the UN Human Rights Council in January.

The UN was further presented with a copy of the West Papuan People’s Petition back in 2019. This is a document that calls upon the UN to facilitate a new and legitimate vote on self-determination. The petition has been signed by 1.8 million West Papuans, or 70 percent of that Indigenous population. And yet, there has been no movement on this issue ever since.

“I reiterate our demand for Indonesia to allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit West Papua,” said Wenda, who has been exiled from his homeland for decades. “Over 110 countries – a clear majority of the UN member states – have now demanded this visit, but Indonesia continues to refuse.”

“Dogiyai is not an isolated incident: every day brings a new atrocity,” the president of the West Papuan provisional government in waiting made clear in ending.

“How long will the world allow this to continue before Indonesia is made to suffer genuine diplomatic consequences for their refusal?”

PAUL GREGOIRE 

Paul Gregoire is a Sydney-based journalist and writer. He’s the winner of the 2021 NSW Council for Civil Liberties Award For Excellence In Civil Liberties Journalism. Prior to Sydney Criminal Lawyers®, Paul wrote for VICE and was the news editor at Sydney’s City Hub.

The humanitarian cost of Indonesia’s refusal to allow a UN Human Rights visit to West Papua 

Indonesia has refused the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights access to West Papua since 2019. This round-up details the human rights abuses Indonesia has committed in West Papua during that time. 
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The ULMWP urges world leaders to renew the outstanding demand for UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visit to West Papua, in the wake of the Dogiyai massacre of six West Papuans, including two minors, by the Indonesian police.

Since 2019, 111 UN member states – a clear majority of the UN General Assembly – have demanded a visit to West Papua by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The first of these demands was made in August 2019 by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), who labelled West Papua ‘the festering human rights sore’ of the Pacific region. Despite this pressure, Indonesia has consistently and deliberately blocked UN access to West Papua.

More than six years have passed since the initial state-level demand for a UN visit was made. To underscore the urgency of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visit, the ULMWP has provided a breakdown of how the human rights situation in West Papua has deteriorated since 2019.

Displacement:

  • At least 107,039 West Papuans are currently displaced by Indonesian military operations – perhaps one in fifteen West Papuans has been a refugee since 2019;
  • More than 20,000 West Papuans were displaced in 2025 alone;
  • A minimum of 1110 West Papuans have died as a result of internal displacement, from disease, malnutrition, or as a result of inadequate medical facilities;
  • Only localised or temporary returns home have been documented, such as 353 returnees in Maybrat in 2022;
  • Some IDPs have been displaced more than once, such as 900+ in Intan Jaya who were forced to leave their homes a second time in mid-2025;
  • Indonesia has at times bombed makeshift refugee camps in West Papua, including in Puncak in February 2026.

Extra-judicial killings:

  • It is impossible to verify the true number of West Papuans killed by Indonesian security forces, due to Indonesia’s strict media and NGO reporting ban, and routine misinformation spread by the Indonesian state in the wake of killings;
  • However, it is likely that at least 653 West Papuans have been killed since December 2018 (the numbers below are minimum estimates);
    • 2019: 278
    • 2020-2021: 93
    • 2022: 33
    • 2023: 81
    • 2024: 40
    • 2025-2026: 128 so far
  • Mass killings are common and accountability is effectively non-existent. Emblematic mass killings during this period include:
  • Fifteen civilians massacred in Soanggama village, Intan Jaya, in October 2025;
  • Up to fifteen civilians executed during a military raid in Intan Jaya in May 2025;
  • ‘Bloody Wamena’: Ten Papuans murdered by security forces (pictured above) in Wamena in February 2023;
  • Ten Papuan civilians massacred in Yahukimo and Fakfak in September 2023;
  • Fifteen killed in Kiwirok in 2021.

Militarisation:

  • As of December 2025, at least 83,177 security forces were stationed in West Papua, roughly one for every twenty-two Indigenous Papuans;
  • This figure includes 56,517 soldiers and 26,660 police, but does not include forces temporarily deployed to West Papua from other regions of Indonesia, so the real number is likely to be higher;
  • At least 40,000 additional troops have been deployed to West Papua since 2019;
  • Hundreds of military posts have been established in West Papua during this time; while no hard figure is available for the entire territory, we know that 31 checkpoints were established between July and September 2025 in Intan Jaya alone;
  • Indonesia is using a range of technologically advanced weaponry on West Papuans, including Brazilian‑made EMB‑314 Super Tucano fighter jets, Chinese blowfish drones, and UK-made sniper rifles.

Environmental destruction:
Douglas Gerrard | The World's Largest Deforestation Project

  • Ecocide in occupied West Papua has increased dramatically since 2019, as Indonesia seeks to use West Papua to secure its future food and energy security;
  • Indonesia launched the largest deforestation project in human history in West Papua in 2024 – a 3-million-hectare rice and sugarcane food estate in Merauke (pictured above), since expanded to the entire South Papua Province;
  • The Merauke food estate – covering an area the size of Wales – is set to release an additional 780 million tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere, more than doubling Indonesia’s existing emissions;
  • Wabu Block, a 1.8-million-hectare gold mine in Intan Jaya, has been under construction since 2021, and continues to displace communities and militarise the Papuan highlands;
  • In 2024, BP completed an expansion of its Tangguh gas field in West Papua, which will now supply 35% of Indonesia’s entire gas supply.

Secrecy is the key weapon Indonesia uses to maintain its genocidal and ecocidal rule over West Papua. By keeping its occupation hidden from the world, Indonesia is able to get away with its crimes with near total impunity, while continuing to expropriate West Papua’s huge mineral wealth. Only international intervention, beginning with a UN Human Rights visit, can stop this suffering. Indonesia must face serious diplomatic consequences until the UN High Commissioner access to West Papua is finally allowed to visit West Papua.

IPWP Chair Alex Sobel with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk

Indonesia’s democracy faces a quiet return of military power 

April 10, 2026Signs of renewed military involvement in civilian life are raising concerns that Indonesia may be drifting back towards the authoritarian practices of its past.

Imagine you’ve seen a street skirmish and call the police. A brief chat reveals the brawlers are off-duty soldiers. They continue to throw punches and rocks. The cops drive away.

The policy was dwifungsi (an adopted loanword), and it ran throughout Indonesia during the 32-year authoritarian rule of the second president, Soeharto, a former general.

At the top was the army – at the bottom the police.

Dwifungsi was dismantled during the Reformation in 2000 by the fourth President, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), now deceased.

A liberal Islamic scholar, he understood the importance of restricting the military to defence and separating it from the police role of domestic peacekeeping.

It hasn’t been an easy transition. Turf wars, access to power and rivalries continue.

Khairul Fahmi, a military analyst at the Institute for Security and Strategic Studies_,_ attributed the recurring clashes between the two forces to “institutional arrogance, a culture of superiority, sectoral egotism, and festering jealousies, dynamics that have grown unchecked.

“Much of the rivalry stems from competition for ‘fertile grounds’ of influence across civil society, bureaucracy, and even parliament.”

Stories of inter-service punch-ups had become ho-hum till a street acid-attack last month in Jakarta on prominent human rights activist Andrie Yunus as he left a legal aid office.

He was badly burned on his face, hands, and chest, covering 24 per cent of his body. He’s been in intensive care, and his family is in protection.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Turk, said he was “deeply concerned” with the attack. Four soldiers from an intelligence unit have allegedly been detained, according to military police commander Yusri Nuryanto.

A decade earlier, a former policeman turned corruption investigator, Novel Baswedan, was walking home from his local mosque in North Jakarta when two men threw acid at his face. He lost an eye.

After more than two years of investigation and a presidential order to find the assailants, he was reported as saying the police were “not really serious in handling his case.”

Two active police officers were convicted and jailed for a year. Novel’s supporters said they were scapegoats and the Mr Big had escaped identification.

Inquiries into the March attack on Andrie suggested the two assailants on a motorbike were soldiers and ordered to send a warning to civilian critics of the return of dwifungsi.

  According to the nation’s leading daily, Kompas, “the shadow of the military’s return to dominance in civilian governance is now increasingly apparent. A total of 2,500 active TNI (Military) personnel have quietly taken up civilian positions, a figure that exceeds the limits set by law.

“If the revision of the TNI Law currently being discussed by the DPR (Parliament) is passed, the last barrier to military involvement in civilian bureaucracy will collapse.

“Not only that, but soldiers will also be given the opportunity to engage in business activities, blurring the clear line that has long separated the military from economic and political interests.”

The California-based Asia Sentinel magazine is warning of “the Darkening Face of Indonesia’s Democracy.

“Reports of intimidation and terror directed at activists, legislative initiatives widely seen as constraining press freedom, and, perhaps most strikingly, the reactivation of military command structures at the regional level.

“… these developments evoke the territorial military influence that defined Indonesia’s authoritarian past, raising urgent questions about whether the country is gradually retreating from the democratic gains achieved since 1998.”

The present President Prabowo Subianto is the former son-in-law of the late Soeharto. He’s known to want the military in civil affairs, as soldiers are trained to follow orders and not challenge.

Personal loyalty is critical in the armed forces; fine in a firefight, though not in professional administrations demanding impartiality.

After the acid splash, Prabowo told some selected journos (not this one) that the attack on Andrie Yunus was a “barbaric act of terrorism” that demands a comprehensive investigation into its masterminds.

“This is terrorism. This is a barbaric act. We must pursue it. We must investigate it! We must find out who ordered it, who paid for it.”

He explicitly guaranteed that no “impunity” would be granted if security personnel are found complicit, vowing that legal proceedings will be conducted strictly and impartially.

Sounds like the right response, except this is Indonesia. The two previous incumbents of the Presidential Palace said much the same thing about the most blatant assassination since the Reformation.

In  2004, lawyer Munir Said Thalib, founder of KontraS, the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence, was poisoned on a Garuda flight while heading to Utrecht University to study for a master’s degree in international law and human rights.

A post-mortem found he died from arsenic in an orange drink. He perished before landing. Then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (another former general) promised Munir’s widow, Suciwati, that the assassination would be thoroughly investigated. It wasn’t.

KontraS is struggling to reopen the case, but there’s no political commitment. This is not a time for Indonesian activists to move about unprotected. Correction: It never has been.The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.

Duncan Graham has been a journalist for more than 40 years in print, radio and TV. He is the author of People Next Door (UWA Press). He is now writing for the English language media in Indonesia from within Indonesia. Duncan Graham has an MPhil degree, a Walkley Award, two Human Rights Commission awards and other prizes for his radio, TV and print journalism in Australia. He lives in East Java.

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IIndonesia’s claims of rice self-sufficiency clash with import deals, opaque data and the growing political control of the food system.

Rice isn’t just a meal for half the world. In Indonesia it’s also an essential ingredient in national sovereignty – and big money deals. Mao Zedong was wrong about “all political power growing out of the barrel of a gun.” In Indonesia it grows in the paddy.

Are all Indonesians now dining on their own home-grown rice with not one imported grain, as the government says? If so, it’s a stunning achievement towards self-sufficiency directed by President Prabowo Subianto and a great boost to national pride.

It should also lead to lower prices.

But is it true?

The rice trade is controlled by the State-owned monopoly and public corporation, Bulog, Badan Urusan Logistik (Logistics Affairs Agency). It runs grain depots around the country and sets the floor price, currently Rp 6,500 (AUD 52 cents) a kilo.

Overall Indonesia produces about 55 million tonnes a year and is the world’s fourth largest grower.

Bulog is the principal source of data on crops, plantings and deliveries. It’s an agency with a record of alleged corruption, mainly concerning illegal sales.

This year it “absorbed” the equivalent of 840,000 tonnes of rice – representing a 2,000 per cent increase from the same period last year. This happened despite major flooding, particularly in Sumatra.

Even assuming yields have been boosted by better cultivation, new varieties and fertilisers, this figure is so astonishing that it deserves scrutiny. So far, the Indonesian media and academic researchers have found better meals elsewhere.

Apart from keeping food on the table, there’s another agenda: to manage everything in the food business and put the Prez in charge without waving a weapon.

Bulog, formerly a civilian agency, is now being run by the Army. Major General Ahmad Rizal Ramdhani was appointed last year. He said his job was to “transform the state-owned food company into a major autonomous body directly under the President.

“The hope is that, in line with the President’s wishes, Bulog will return to its former glory, like it did in (the Soeharto era). Bulog shouldn’t just be managing rice, but managing everything, so as to guarantee food self-sufficiency.”

Soeharto, Indonesia’s second president, died in 2008. He was also a former general. For a time his son-in-law was Prabowo.

Last year Ahmad’s predecessor Lieutenant Novi Helmi Prasetya lasted four months as Bulog’s boss. No reason was given for his return to the ranks.

Bulog’s warehouses reportedly hold 2.4 million tonnes, a figure that could rise to three million by the end of the month, potentially marking a new national record. New depots are planned.

The Indonesian NGO Prakarsa (Initiative), “an institution for research and policy advocacy” in Jakarta , reported that in the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed with the US in February, Indonesia had “committed to importing 1,000 tonnes of rice.

“Quantitatively, the figure appears small … however, this commitment has sparked controversy. Indonesia, while claiming a rice surplus, is locking in rice imports from countries that are not major global rice producers.

“This is where the question arises: does the food import commitment in the trade agreement erode the food self-sufficiency and sovereignty that has been touted so far?”

In 2024, Indonesia imported 4.52 million tons of rice, a 47 per cent increase from more than three million tonnes the previous year.

A sudden surplus of more than four million tonnes in 2025 looks curious, particularly when credited to Prabowo during his first year in office.

Former presidents also promised – and failed – to make the nation self-sufficient in foods.

Since 2008, when the population was 240 million, Indonesia has imported rice, mainly from Vietnam and Thailand, to ensure the staple ingredient is always available.

Any dearth could lead to food riots, as at the turn of the century, when the nation’s crops were damaged by the El Niño drought.

The other factor in poor harvests at the time was Krismon – the economic crisis caused by student riots and the dethroning of the autocratic second president, Soeharto.

The population is now 285 million. Land available for cultivating the grain has shrunk as roads, industry, and housing have moved onto the flattest areas in an archipelago of mountains.

According to Indonesia Corruption Watch_,_ Bulog originally served as a food provider and distributor for the people.

“With broader authority, including price stabilisation, supplier selection, and food security, Bulog has become a cash cow. Trillions of rupiah can flow into Bulog at any time.

“Its position as an institution directly under the president allows Bulog to access non-budgetary funds outside the state budget … This makes it difficult for the House of Representatives or the Supreme Audit Agency to access Bulog.

“(Two) former Bulog heads were only able to be investigated after President Soeharto left power. Both were tried and convicted after being found guilty of corruption.

“Bulog had to disburse Rp 40 billion (AUD 3,300) from a non-budgetary account, allegedly for Golkar Party campaign expenses. Bulog will always be a magnet for various political parties and the ruling elite to compete for.”

This month, Bulog claimed its warehouses held 2.4 million tonnes and had enough to start exporting. The often unhusked grain is held in 50 kg sacks and usually has to be lugged on the backs of youths dashing up swaying planks to load trucks. Mechanisation is rare.

It’s then sold to private companies for cleaning, refining and marketing under brands and retailed in five and ten-kilo plastic bags.

During the rule of the first President, Soekarno, Indonesia exported rice with a reputation for high quality. Those glory days are regularly recalled by politicians claiming the nation can be food self-sufficient again.

It has now apparently achieved that goal and given Prabowo’s reputation a big tick.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.

Duncan Graham

Duncan Graham has been a journalist for more than 40 years in print, radio and TV. He is the author of People Next Door (UWA Press). He is now writing for the English language media in Indonesia from within Indonesia. Duncan Graham has an MPhil degree, a Walkley Award, two Human Rights Commission awards and other prizes for his radio, TV and print journalism in Australia. He lives in East Java.

John Menadue

Support our independentndonesia’s rice bowl gets bigger

Alleged destruction of property and intimidation of a Papuan Pastor amid escalating security operations in Dekai, Yahukimo Regency

19 March 2026 / 5 minutes of reading

Between 12 December 2025 and February 2026, a series of incidents of alleged shooting, vandalism, robbery, intimidation and continued harassment were reported at the home of Rev. Victor Kobak in Jalan Gunung, Dekai District, Yahukimo Regency, Papua Pegunungan province. Rev Kobak leads the Evanhastia congregation, belonging to the Evangelical Church in Indonesia (GIDI). The events occurred in the context of security force raids in response to the deteriorating security situation in the Yahukimo Regency. Authorities reacted with intensified military deployments, restrictions on civilian activities and a series of reported arbitrary arrests in Dekai Town. Rev Kobak reportedly suffered material losses, psychological distress and ongoing intimidation, while the wider community experienced heightened fear and insecurity linked to escalating armed conflict dynamics in the area.

Security forces came to Rev Kobak’s house, opening fire at his house, damaging parts of the property, and seizing personnel belongings. On 12 December 2025 joint security forces reportedly opened fire at the house belonging to Rev. Victor Kobak. Bullets struck walls and roof sections at both the front and rear of the building, causing structural damage and material losses. On 22 January 2026, security personnel again entered Rev Kobak’s house without showing a warrant and devastated the interior. The doors were kicked in and damaged. After the house search, personal belongings were missing. On 31 January 2026, security force personnel again came to Rev Kobak’s house, dismantling parts of the house and removing items, including his Starlink communication equipment, four sleeping bags or mats, and work-related equipment. Four doors were dismantled.

Following the circulation of video documentation of the incidents, Rev. Kobak received anonymous threatening phone calls and hostile social media posts in February 2026. The acts of intimidation included attempts to stigmatise him as a member of the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) in social media posts. These actions increased fear for the safety of the Rev Kobak and his family.

Deteriorating security situation and series of arbitrary detentions in Dekai

The harassments and intimidation of Rev Kobak occurred amid a significant escalation of security operations across Yahukimo Regency in early 2026, particularly in the Dekai District. Reports indicate the establishment of additional security presence, expanded patrols and increased surveillance of civilian movement. Statements by security officials during meetings with business operators on 17 February 2026 suggested that civilians remaining in public spaces beyond designated curfew hours could be warned, detained overnight or otherwise subjected to enforcement measures. Such policies reportedly contributed to fears of arbitrary detention, racial profiling and collective stigmatisation of indigenous Papuans as potential supporters or members of armed groups.

The deteriorating situation also had humanitarian consequences. Healthcare workers at the Yahukimo Regional General Hospital and community health centres publicly stated on 20 February 2026 that they felt unsafe while performing their duties amid the presence of armed personnel near medical facilities. They demanded explicit security guarantees from both Indonesian security forces and armed Papuan groups, emphasising their neutral humanitarian role protected under International Humanitarian Law. Reports further indicated temporary closures of healthcare facilities and disruptions to essential services due to security fears, affecting civilian access to medical treatment.

Church leaders similarly expressed alarm at the militarisation of civilian spaces. On 21 February 2026, Rev. Atias Matuan, Chair of the Yahukimo Churches’ Fellowship (PGGY), urged security forces not to station personnel at hospitals, warning that their presence had traumatised patients and undermined public trust in essential services. These developments reflect a broader climate of insecurity in which civilian institutions such as churches, schools and healthcare facilities have become increasingly entangled in conflict dynamics.

Human rights analysis

The reported shooting at a civilian residence, vandalism and removal of property raise concerns regarding arbitrary interference with the home and unlawful destruction of civilian objects, particularly if conducted by state security forces without lawful basis or judicial oversight. Such conduct violates the right to privacy, family life and property, as well as abuses of authority under domestic criminal law.

The intimidation of a religious leader and the dissemination of personal identity data without consent may amount to harassment of a human rights defender and interference with freedom of religion, expression and association. In conflict-affected contexts, religious figures often play key humanitarian and mediation roles; targeting them risks undermining civilian protection mechanisms and community resilience.

More broadly, the imposition of curfews combined with threats of detention for civilians present in public spaces may engage international human rights standards relating to freedom of movement and protection from arbitrary arrest or detention. Where security operations result in the closure of hospitals or intimidation of healthcare workers, this may also violate obligations to respect and protect medical personnel and ensure access to essential services.

Under International Humanitarian Law applicable to non-international armed conflicts, parties must distinguish between civilians and combatants, respect the neutrality of medical personnel and religious institutions, and refrain from pillage or destruction of civilian property unless imperatively required by military necessity. The reported developments in Dekai suggest a shrinking humanitarian space and increasing risks to civilians not directly participating in hostilities.

On 31 January 2026, security personnel again searched Rev Kobak’s house without warrant and devastated the interior

On 12 December 2025 joint security forces reportedly opened fire at the house belonging to Rev. Victor Kobak. The bullets struck walls and the roof.

Social media post accusing Rev Kobak of affiliation with the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB)

Detailed Case Data
Location: Dekai, Yahukimo regency, Highland Papua, Indonesia (-4.8638158, 139.4837298) 
Region: Indonesia, Highland Papua, Yahukimo, Dekai
Total number of victims: 1

#Number of VictimsName, DetailsGenderAgeGroup AffiliationViolations
1.Victor Kobak

maleadult Indigenous Peoplescriminalisation, intimidation

Period of incident: 12/12/2025 – 11/03/2026
Perpetrator: , Indonesian Security Forces
Issues: indigenous peoples, security force violence

Acid attack against human rights defender Andrie Yunus in Central Jakarta

17 March 2026 / 3 minutes of reading

On 12 March 2026, Mr Andrie Yunus, Deputy Coordinator of the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), was attacked with acid by unidentified perpetrators whilst riding a motorcycle on Jalan Salemba I–Talang, Central Jakarta. The attack caused serious injuries affecting various body parts, including his face, eyes, chest, and hands. Mr Yunus was subsequently admitted to Cipto Mangunkusumo Hospital (RSCM) in Jakarta, where he remains under specialised medical care.

Earlier that evening, Mr Andrie Yunus had attended and recorded a podcast discussion on “Remilitarisation and Judicial Review in Indonesia” at the offices of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI). After leaving the premises, he travelled by motorcycle through Central Jakarta. According to CCTV analysis and witness statements, the suspected perpetrators had followed Mr Yunus on two motorcycles after he had left the YLBHI office.

At approximately 11:30 pm, the suspects were observed waiting near a petrol station and a fast-food outlet in Cikini, before resuming surveillance as the victim continued his journey. Shortly thereafter, at around 23:37 pm, the perpetrators approached him on their motorcycle from the opposite direction on Jalan Talang. While passing Mr Yunus, the person sitting in the back splashed a corrosive substance believed to be acid directly at his face and upper body. The victim fell from his motorcycle and screamed for assistance. Residents nearby provided immediate aid and arranged his transfer for emergency medical treatment.

Police later confirmed that the perpetrators split up after the attack, travelling towards different areas including Ragunan, Kalibata, and Bogor. Investigators analysed footage from approximately 86 CCTV cameras across Jakarta in an effort to reconstruct the suspects’ movements. Evidence recovered from the scene reportedly includes a purple tumbler-type container believed to have contained the acid, as well as other items such as a helmet suspected to belong to one of the attackers.

Investigation and developments

The Jakarta Metropolitan Police elevated the case from preliminary investigation to a formal criminal inquiry aimed at identifying suspects, citing indications of premeditation, coordination, and surveillance prior to the attack. Authorities believe the perpetrators monitored the victim’s daily routines and selected the timing and location strategically.

Civil society organisations, legal experts, and members of the Advocacy Team for Democracy have characterised the attack as an attempted premediated murder, emphasising similarities with previous attacks on activists in Indonesia, including the acid attack against anti-corruption investigator Novel Baswedan (2017) and the poisoning murder of HRD Munir Said Thalib (2004). They raised concerns that investigations in such cases historically failed to identify or prosecute alleged masterminds.

Indonesia’s President reportedly instructed the National Police Chief to ensure a professional, transparent, and professional investigation, while parliamentary oversight bodies pledged to monitor progress. The United Nations human rights leadership publicly expressed grave concern over the attack, emphasising the obligation of the State to protect human rights defenders and hold perpetrators accountable.

Human rights analysis

The acid attack constitutes a grave violation of the rights to life, security of person, and freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as a direct attack on the legitimate work of a human rights defender. The apparent premeditation, use of dangerous corrosive substances, and coordinated surveillance strongly indicate that the act may qualify as attempted premeditated murder under Indonesian criminal law.

Moreover, the attack reflects a broader pattern of intimidation and violence against civil society actors in Indonesia, raising concerns regarding impunity, inadequate HRD protection mechanisms, and potential involvement or tolerance by elements linked to state institutions. The failure to conduct an effective investigation could further undermine public trust in the rule of law and Indonesia’s democratic commitments.

Under international law, Indonesia has a positive obligation to prevent, investigate, punish, and provide remedies for attacks against human rights defenders, particularly when such acts may be linked to their advocacy work. The targeting of Mr Andrie Yunus following his involvement in sensitive issues, including security sector legislation and past protest investigations, suggests a possible retaliatory motive aimed at silencing dissenting voices.

Detailed Case Data
Location: Jl. Salemba I No.8A, RT.3/RW.6, Kenari, Kec. Senen, Kota Jakarta Pusat, Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta 10320, Indonesia (-6.1988339, 106.8492458) 
Region: Indonesia, Jakarta
Total number of victims: 1

#Number of VictimsName, DetailsGenderAgeGroup AffiliationViolations
1.Andrie Yunus

diverseadult Human Rights Defender (HRD)right to life, torture

Period of incident: 12/03/2026 – 12/03/2026
Perpetrator: , Other
Issues: human rights defenders

————————————–

Drone attack on the office of Papuan movement organisation KNPB in Jayapura

18 March 2026 /

The headquarters of the Papuan movement organisation West Papua National Committee (KNPB) in Jayapura, Papua Province, were attacked by a drone in the early hours of 16 March 2026 at approximately 04:16 am. The drone reportedly dropped an explosive device which detonated in the office courtyard whilst several KNPB members and officials were asleep inside the building. The incident follows a previous arson attack against the same office on 17 January 2026, indicating an emerging pattern of intimidation against the political activists and human rights defenders in West Papua.

The KNPB is a non-violent civil resistance movement in West Papua, which has been organising West Papua-wide mass protests for self-determination through a political referendum for more than ten years. Their members have committed to non-violent protest by organising peaceful demonstrations and political discussions.

According to information documented by local human rights activists, an unidentified drone is believed to have dropped an explosive device into the courtyard of the KNPB headquarters in the Kambolker area in Waena, a sub-district of Jayapura City. The device reportedly exploded approximately two metres from the main office building and near the boundary wall separating the compound from a residential area.

The loud explosion abruptly awakened KNPB members sleeping inside the office and caused panic among occupants and nearby residents. Several residents reportedly left their homes and gathered at the scene. Following the incident, local human rights activists conducted preliminary documentation, including photographing the crime scene and collecting visible fragments believed to be components of the explosive device. The impact of the detonation in the courtyard of the KNPB office was still visible on the following day, illustrating the force of the blast and the potential lethality of the attack (see photos below, source: independent HRD).

Given that multiple individuals were present inside the building at the time, the incident posed a serious and immediate threat to life and physical integrity. The attack also significantly undermined the sense of safety of civil society actors operating in Jayapura City and more broadly in the Papuan provinces.

Fragments believed to be part of the explosive device, including black metal plates suspected to be bomb casing, cardboard fragments, small screws and bolts.

Previous arson attack in January 2026

The drone attack follows a prior attack on the same office on 17 January 2026 at approximately 3:16 am. During that incident, unknown perpetrators allegedly poured petrol on the office walls and set them alight. KNPB members who were asleep at the time awoke upon noticing flames and were able to extinguish the fire manually, preventing the blaze from spreading further. Witnesses reported that the perpetrators fled the scene in a black Toyota Avanza vehicle waiting nearby.

Evidence documented after the arson attempt reportedly included traces of petrol on the office wall, a container wrapped in duct tape, plastic sheeting, and a grey handkerchief (see photos below, source: independent HRD).

Pattern of intimidation against civil society organisations

These two incidents appear to form part of a broader pattern of intimidation targeting civil society organisations, journalists, and human rights defenders in Indonesia. On 12 March 2026, Mr Andrie Yunus, Deputy Coordinator of the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), was attacked with acid by unidentified perpetrators whilst riding a motorcycle on Jalan Salemba I–Talang, Central Jakarta. The issue has also reached alarming levels in the Papuan provinces. Previous attacks in the region include a Molotov cocktail attack against the office of the independent media outlet JUBI in October 2024.

The reported use of drone technology to deliver an explosive device suggests a relatively high level of planning and operational capability. Such methods heighten concerns regarding the security for organisations engaged in critical journalism, human rights advocacy and community mobilisation. At the time of writing, no official investigation had publicly identified the perpetrators or established a motive. Civil society actors have called for a transparent, independent, and comprehensive investigation into the alleged attacks.

Human rights analysis

The bombing and earlier arson attempt potentially engage multiple human rights protections under international and Indonesian law. Attacks against civil society organisations threaten the right to security of person, the right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of expression. These right are enshrined in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Indonesia is a party.

States have a positive obligation not only to refrain from violating human rights but also to protect individuals and organisations from harm by third parties. Failure to prevent, investigate, and prosecute repeated attacks may raise concerns regarding state compliance with its duty of due diligence. Such incidents may also contribute to a climate of fear that restricts civic space and undermines democratic participation in the Papuan provinces.

Drone attack on 16 March 2026

Arson attack on 17 January 2026

Detailed Case Data
Location: Kampung Waena, Heram, Jayapura City, Papua, Indonesia (-2.5932318, 140.6339916)Kamwolker area, Waena
Region: Indonesia, Papua, Jayapura, Heram
Total number of victims: few

#Number of VictimsName, DetailsGenderAgeGroup AffiliationViolations
1.few 

diverseunknown Indigenous Peoplesfreedom of assembly, freedom of expression, intimidation

Period of incident: 16/03/2026 – 16/03/2026
Perpetrator: Other
Issues: indigenous peoples ————————————————————————————————

TAPOL September-November Quarterly Update 

https://tapol.org/publications/tapol-september-november-quarterly-update

 

28 November 2025

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As Indonesia marked its 80th birthday with much fanfare, pomp and ceremony, it has been clear that the country sits at an uncomfortable crossroads, with underlying challenges further buffeting Prabowo’s year in office. Mass protests exploded across the country, calling out the hypocrisy of the political elite, the worsening economic situation and then security force violence. This culminated in the death of motorbike delivery driver Affan Kurniawan, which led to an outpouring of grief and rage and then mass arrests of civil society actors. Internationally, Indonesia has been trying to flex its muscles to present an intermediate path in the Israel-Palestine conflict, but its intervention at an event during the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva shows its complete lack of sympathy for international understandings of indigenous peoples and their fight for recognition. This continues to be made manifest in the Indonesian government’s policy in West Papua, with prisoner transfers and expanding food estates showing the Government’s desire to pacify and make economic gains in the region at the expense of the actual welfare of the people. 

Mass Protests

The protests in August drew some comparisons to the 1998 mass protests and extended to every region in Indonesia. It resonated with the public’s worry about the Government’s strict austerity programme, the cutting of state subsidies and parliament increasing the housing allowance for its members. The protests then escalated across the country as a response to the murder of motorcycle delivery driver, Affan Kurniawan, who was run over by a tactical police car as he was trying to make a delivery during some of the initial protests.    

Within a few days, riotous acts had also occurred in some of the big cities. Mobs targeted the houses of government ministers and the local parliament building in Makassar was burnt down and led to the deaths of those trapped inside. More than 3,000 people including prominent young pro-democracy activists were arrested, on charges of inciting violence in riots, among others. At least 11 people died.    

Compared to other countries in the region like Nepal, where protests kept going until the government had been toppled, the momentum of protests has since died down in Indonesia. It was more spontaneous in Indonesia and it was not led by any political party. In some cases, the riots and attacks were aided and abetted by the military, with plainclothes personnel arrested, doing nothing to stop the riots, and in one case, handing out drinks and cash to those taking part in the rioting.   

The uprising and riots have exposed internal conflicts within Prabowo’s inner circle. These are mainly between civilian politicians, like Dasco Ahmad, Prabowo’s right-hand man for political affairs in Gerindra, and those from the military, such as Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, Prabowo’s old aide who is now Minister of Defence, and with a history of human rights violations in Aceh, East Timor and Jakarta. In addition to this political dimension, there is also the conflict between police and military, with the military pushing for speedier prosecutions.    

Beyond this power struggle, the underlying cause of the protests is a series of long-term issues, so there would only need to be a further spark for it to rekindle into a mass movement, like that which toppled Suharto. The government response is not addressing the core problem. The cabinet was reshuffled, including moving some infamous ministers in corruption cases, but economic policy has remained the same. There has been a discrepancy between independent observations and government reports in the health of the economy. Government figures claimed ongoing economic development hit the highest ever-record of six per cent, while economists say four per cent, and the unemployment rate was also claimed to be the lowest in 20 years. This has not resonated with people’s felt reality. 

Prabowo’s first anniversary highlights contradictory, increasingly authoritarian, policies

20th October 2025 marked the first year of Prabowo’s administration. There’s been a noticeable attempt to keep in balance both populist policies and consolidating the repressive tools of militarism, or Prabowo’s desire for a powerful state and a desire to be liked. Like in his response to protests, Prabowo has been keen to try and sugarcoat a more hardline policy with gimmicks designed to appease people.   

In stark contrast to the granting of amnesty for Papuan political prisoners we covered in the June-August Update (which is available on our website), four Papuan political prisoners were sentenced to seven months in prison for treason on 19th November, then released on the 23rd, having already served their time in pre-trial custody. Known as the Sorong Four, these members of the Federal Republic of West Papua (Negara Federal Republik Papua Barat – NFRPB) had been arrested whilst distributing leaflets calling for peace in several government departments, and then were accused of treason, before being transferred from Sorong to Makassar for the trial and sentencing, violating their human rights (Full background in our statement from August). The case received a lot of attention due to vocal support for the prisoners, leading to the arrest of at least 23 people, one shot and dispersals when they were transferred from Sorong to Makassar, and more on the day of the indictment.   

One example of mixing gimmicks with Prabowo’s attempts to re-write history has been the declaration of former President Suharto as a national hero of Indonesia on 10th November. Despite shadows over his regime, including the mass killings of 1965 and 1966, invasion of Timor-Leste, and repression and crony capitalism, the declaration indicates the desire of his former son-in-law, President Prabowo Subianto to emulate the New Order in his own government. Protestors have called the declaration a ‘distortion of history’. It has also been sugarcoated with the simultaneous declaration of former Reformasi-era President Abdurahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur) and labour activist Marsinah as national heroes. This is despite the fact that both faced repression from Suharto’s government, with the latter even being murdered by his regime.    

Finally, in late September, two ministers (the Coordinating Minister for Food Affairs and Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning) designated 481 thousand hectares of land in Merauke Regency (Papua Selatan Province) for a Food Estate project. It was claimed that this had been done in line with the national food resilience program, one of President Prabowo’s priority policies. The Ministers also said that the land belonged to the state and not to local indigenous peoples. However, the designation was fiercely resisted by the indigenous communities of the area, and started a string of protests. 

Indonesia’s fundamental misunderstanding on the UN and indigenous peoples

On 22nd September, Indonesia voted in support of the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine at the UN General Assembly, where the motion was passed. However, Indonesia did not condemn the genocide and war crimes committed by the Israeli Government. Indonesia has historically supported Palestine, but Prabowo seems to be softer on Israel than previous administrations. His stance towards Donald Trump’s government is also friendly, as can be seen from a leaked personal chat at a conference in Egypt with Trump where he asked for access to Trump’s sons for business reasons.   

On the same day as the General Assembly vote, an event was held at the United Nations in Geneva (the full recording of which is accessible online), on indigenous rights in Indonesia. The Indonesian representative defended the National Strategic Projects (PSNs), claiming that the relevant customary law communities were consulted, and boasted about recognition of customary territory and economic growth from the projects. However, what was very enlightening was the following statement:   

‘The term Indigenous peoples… simply cannot be applied and more than semantic hurdles [exist], simply due to our country’s unique history of colonialism and anthropological context [sic]’   

Referencing his visit to West Papua in July, the UN Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Rights, Albert Barume, noted that the biggest issues highlighted in his consultation with indigenous groups was the ‘lack of recognition of indigenous people’. This, as Barume pointed out, is an issue that is widespread among Asian and African states. Indigenous peoples have faced injustices grounded in historic and continuing perceptions that they are uncivilised, savage and not modern, so are forced to abandon their culture and way of life. Indigenous peoples and groups have suffered degrading and dehumanising acts including forced assimilation by states that refuse to recognise them.    

West Papua continues to be hidden away from international scrutiny, pointing to a lack of desire by the Indonesian government to recognise indigenous rights. The stalling of the full legal recognition of indigenous peoples in Indonesia for more than a decade in Parliament shows that this is not being taken seriously by the Government.   

Due to this approach and mindset, indigenous groups face gastrocolonialism, involving a forced change of diet from indigenous to foreign foods, land dispossession and a lack of recognition. Their land has been cleared for the Food Estate in Merauke. The Indonesian government’s repeating of the same lines regarding economic opportunity shows this fundamental disconnect in clear relief.   

The Indonesian government needs to update their view of indigenous peoples and groups so that it aligns with international standards, and not hide behind claims of exceptions to duties.     

Other Big Stories

  • On 23rd September, the EU and Indonesia signed the Indonesia-European Union Comprehensive Economic Partnership (IEU-CEPA), covering trade, investment, environmental protection and sustainability, after almost a decade of negotiations. Primarily, many tariffs on Indonesian goods entering the EU have been slashed. This creates an opening for EU companies to invest in Indonesia. Despite all the positive pronouncements by the Indonesian government that it would add US$2.8 billion to the Indonesian economy and five million jobs, serious concerns have been raised as to how this will lead to an expansion of palm oil plantations and the increase in its products sold on the European market
  •  
  • On 6th August, the local Papua Province Election Commission (KPU Papua) repeated elections for Governor and Vice Governor of Papua Province, on the Constitutional Court’s (MK) order. This followed the posthumous disqualification of the victorious Vice Governor. The result was that the losing candidates (Mathius Fakhiri and Aryoko Rumaropen) in the first gubernatorial election won in the rerun. The result was upheld by the Constitutional Court’s decision in mid-September. During the campaign in Papua Province, there were reports of hate speech based on religion and ethnicity made by one of the sides; and allegations by the other side that public servants and police officials had been illegally mobilised. It was a close election, as the winning side only won by about 3,000 votes. Matthias was a former chief of police and was the candidate for Prabowo’s coalition, and was alleged by national news publications to have received support from the current provincial Chief of Police as well as public servants, including the previous acting Governor. Meanwhile, the other candidate was a former mayor of Jayapura, and was indigenous to the city, so received support from Papuan groups and support from the largest Protestant church. The campaign had been marred by reported political interference and hate speech, with the final winner being a Muslim convert, for the first time in Papuan history. 


  • In mid-September, media reported that the Australian Federal Police (AFP) had arrested two men and charged them with the trafficking of ammunition and firearms from Australia to the armed pro-Papua independence group, the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB, Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat). The criminal investigation was initiated jointly with the New Zealand authorities as the result of the TPNPB’s hostage taking of New Zealand pilot Philip Mehrtens. One of the suspects is Australian, whilst the other is a New Zealander. 
  • In NGO news, Pusaka held a public discussion at Taman Ismail Marzuki, Jakarta, titled ‘Setahun Rezim Perang’ (A year of war regime) on 7th November 2025. During the first year of Prabowo’s presidency, three companies have continuously destroyed the indigenous landscape of West Papua, causing a total of 31,508 hectares of damage. Meanwhile, a group of Papuan women, together with the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation desk in Papua, launched a working group on 8th November 2025 in Jakarta. The rationale behind it stems from the numerous cases of human rights violations, particularly against women and children, that have occurred in Papua since 1963 and which continue to this day. In addition, other conditions such as the victims of PSN in Merauke and Maybrat have led to internal displacement on their own land.

TAPOL Publications

Further Links

  •  Centre for Climate Crime and Climate Justice at Queen Mary University of London releases a report, ‘Bringing it All Back Home: The Role of British Companies in the Destruction of West Papua’.
  • Pusaka press release, ‘Condemning the Serakahnomics Project Policy and the Tolerance of Human Rights and Environmental Violations in the Merauke National Strategic Project (PSN)’ (English translation)
  • Pusaka report on the first year of the Prabowo-Gibran government, ‘The First Year of the Prabowo-Gibran War Regime’ (English translation in second half of document)
  • Mongabay covers reopening of Raja Ampat nickel mine, despite concerns of environmental damage caused by the site.
  • The Kurawal Foundation launches report, ‘Democracy under Prabowo-Gibran: Year One’
  • Human Rights Monitor releases Q3 Report on human rights and conflict developments in West Papua.
  • Human Rights Monitor also releases update on the situation of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) in West Papua, covering developments during October.
  • Human Rights Monitor’s Andrew de Sousa interviewed in a podcast regarding the recent trade deal organised between Indonesia and the EU and the situation in West Papua.
  • Academic Paper released by researchers at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, on ‘Predatory Mining, Conflict and Political Spaces: The Case of Grasberg Mine in West Papua’
  • Unrepresented Nations and Peoples’ Organisation (UNPO) Academy releases an article covering the history of independence struggles in West Papua, Aceh and the South Moluccas.
  • Early Warning Project release a report looking at ‘Major Developments and Worsening Risks for Mass Atrocities in Papua, Indonesia’.

Annual Report 2025: Human Rights and Conflict in West Papua 

Human Righrs Monitor

1) Annual Report 2025: Human Rights and Conflict in West Papua 

Reports / Indonesia, West Papua / 13 March 2026

Executive Summary

The human rights situation in West Papua[1] throughout 2025 reveals a critical pivot point in the decades-long conflict between the Indonesian state and the indigenous Papuan population. While certain systemic patterns, such as the architecture of legal impunity and the suppression of peaceful political dissent, remain stagnant, 2025 has introduced a series of aggressive new patterns that represent a significant departure from the dynamics of 2024 and previous years. Case documentation by local human rights groups and independent activists indicates that the situation has transitioned from a localised highland insurgency into an extensive and modern tactics warfare across the central highlands.

Military members are pushing into remote areas, establishing military outposts in indigenous villages to gain control over remote areas. Military operations in these areas have been characterised by the use of anti-personnel landmines or booby traps and aerial warfare technologies, including weaponised drones and fighter planes.  The massive structural expansion of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) under the administration of President Prabowo Subianto opened new frontiers for systematic land grabbing in Merauke, Biak-Numfor, Intan Jaya, and other geographic areas of economic interest.   

The data indicate that the primary drivers of conflict-related human rights violations are no longer immediate responses to armed resistance, but a coordinated effort to secure territory for resource extraction and economic development in West Papua. Indonesia’s new administration under President Prabowo Subianto has pursued a security-based approach, introducing plans for up to 500 new battalions to secure and implement infrastructure and agribusiness projects. This marks the most significant peacetime military expansion in Indonesia’s modern history.  As the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) continues to climb and the military presence keeps expanding, indigenous Papuans face an existential threat to their security, land and culture.

As of December 2025, over 105,000 people in West Papua were internally displaced, with most IDPs having not returned to their villages due to ongoing conflict or heavy military presence.  The number of IDPs has risen from roughly 85,000 IDPs reported in 2024. The central government continues to deny the existence of conflict-driven internal displacement in West Papua, showing no signs of facilitating humanitarian access or withdrawal of security force personnel from the region. Many displaced families have lived in limbo since the armed conflict situation significantly deteriorated in December 2018, afraid to return to their militarised home areas. IDPs are sheltering in makeshift camps or remote forests with little to no aid, facing acute shortages of food, clean water, medicine, and shelter. Ongoing security operations impede humanitarian access to IDPs, whose vast majority consists of indigenous Papuans. They are disproportionately affected by these operations, which commonly target indigenous communities. Examples from Intan Jaya, Pegunungan Bintang, and other regencies illustrate that the increased presence of security personnel in previously unaffected areas fuels violence and suffering for the local civilian population, rather than establishing security and stability.

Extrajudicial killings, torture, and enforced disappearances persisted at alarming rates. Reported cases of torture and ill-treatment of Papuan civilians rose significantly in comparison to previous years. The year 2025 also saw a spike in the cases of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detention, intimidation, and violations of the freedom of assembly. Civilians in conflict areas bear the risk of violence from both state and non-state actors, resulting in dozens of deaths, injuries, and at least 11 reported victims of enforced disappearance throughout the year. Like previous years, the militarisation of government administration under President Prabowo and the restriction of independent media impede the exposure of human rights violations to the Indonesian public and international community. Narratives about West Papua in the national media are often shaped by the military, which is often the only state institution present in conflict areas.

Freedom of expression and peaceful assembly continued to face heavy restrictions in 2025. Indonesian authorities cracked down on protests and political dissent in West Papua, often with arbitrary arrests and force. Journalists and human rights defenders also faced intimidation and violence, highlighted by the unresolved Molotov attack on the Papuan media outlet Jubi. A landmark Constitutional Court ruling in May 2025 offered a rare positive development. The constitutional court strengthened protections for free speech by barring government bodies and officials from using defamation laws to target critics.

Indigenous Papuans’ land rights and livelihoods came under increasing pressure in 2025. Government-driven natural resource projects accelerated without meaningful consent, leading to systematic indigenous rights violations. In the central highlands, military units occupied villages near the Wabu Block gold mining concession in Intan Jaya, prompting community mass protests. In the Papua Selatan Province, the Strategic National Project (PSN) in Merauke continued expansion. The massive agricultural project is implemented by military personnel without Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) of the indigenous Marind people. Likewise, in Papua Barat Daya Province, the Indigenous Moi Tribe struggled against new palm oil concessions that threaten West Papua’s last intact forests. Large-scale agricultural projects, timber logging, and mining operations have led to massive environmental destruction and the erosion of indigenous culture.

The accessibility, quality, and adequacy of healthcare and education services in West Papua are poor, ranking among the lowest in the country. There are no signs of improvement, especially in conflict-affected areas. Hundreds of villages in the highlands do not have access to functional schools or clinics because teachers and health workers fled ongoing violence. Even in urban areas, public services have reached alarming low levels. Major hospitals faced staff strikes and corruption scandals. These failures, alongside significant special autonomy funds ostensibly allocated to West Papua, underscore a persistent gap in basic services and government accountability.

The 2025 Annual Report is organised in two main parts, following the 2024 report structure. Section I covers Civil and Political Rights, examining patterns of impunity, violence, restrictions on fundamental freedoms, indigenous peoples’ rights, and social rights (health, education). Section II addresses Conflict and Displacement, detailing the armed conflict dynamics and the internal displacement crisis. Statistical tables are included below to summarise key trends.


Malind Indigenous People Defend Their Customary Land Rights Under Intimidation

March 6, 2026 in Animha Reading Time: 4 mins read

0

Author: Aida Ulim – Editor: Arjuna Pademme

Jayapura, Jubi – The struggle of the Malind indigenous people in Merauke Regency, South Papua, to defend their customary lands and forests from government land clearing projects for plantation and agricultural investment has not been easy. They have faced intimidation and pressure from the military.

Andreas Mahuse, a Malind indigenous person, said that the community there experienced pressure from the military following the forest clearing. Around a thousand military personnel were stationed in Ilwayab District, Merauke Regency.

According to him, a number of mistakes were made by the central government, provincial government, and Merauke Regency Government in implementing investment projects in the Malind community’s customary territory.

“The first is the taking of customary land since 2024 without the consent and notification of the indigenous community,” said Andreas Mahuse after the Malind indigenous community filed a lawsuit with the Jayapura State Administrative Court (PTUN Jayapura) in Waena, Jayapura City, Papua, on Thursday (March 5, 2026).

He said there had never been any dialogue or negotiation between the government or the company and the indigenous community regarding land ownership status and the planned transfer of land to the company.

“There should have been a meeting with us, the indigenous people, to discuss who owns this land and whether or not the community agreed to its use. However, such a process never occurred,” he said.

Andreas Mahuse stated that the lawsuit filed with the Jayapura Administrative Court (PTUN) was also part of the Malind indigenous people’s efforts to defend their customary land.

The lawsuit was filed by five representatives of the Malind indigenous people: Simon Petrus Balagaize, Sinta Gebze, Andreas Mahuze, Liborius Kodai Moiwend, and Kanisius Dagil, under case number 9/G/LH/2026/PTUN Jayapura.

The Malind indigenous people are challenging the Merauke Regent’s Decree Number 100.3.3.2/1105/2025 concerning the environmental feasibility permit for the construction of a 135-kilometer road for the National Strategic Project (PSN).

“[This lawsuit] is a form of struggle to defend customary land and forests from the government’s National Strategic Project (PSN) for rice paddy development,” said Andreas Mahuse.

Andreas Mahuse explained that the 135-kilometer road, part of the rice paddy development project, was forcibly constructed without the community’s consent.

The road stretches from Wanam Village, Ilwayab District, passing through several villages and reaching Muting District.

“The villages [through which the road construction passes] include Wanam, Wogikel, Salamepe, Nakias, Tagaepe, Ilhalik, Kapdel, and Solo Village. This project also crosses several districts, namely Ilwayab, Ngguti, and Muting Districts,” he said.

The indigenous community ultimately filed the lawsuit, alleging administrative errors in the project. Forest clearing for road construction began in September 2024, but the environmental permit document was only issued in September 2025.

“This is a very serious state administrative error for us indigenous people,” he said.

Furthermore, Mahuse continued, the indigenous community has never seen important documents such as the Environmental Impact Analysis (AMDAL) or the technical development planning documents.

The project is also considered to have the potential to damage the indigenous community’s culture, as it has changed the community’s lifestyle, which has traditionally relied on sago as a staple food, replacing it with rice.

“This is not only an environmental issue, but also a violation of the indigenous community’s cultural rights,” said Andreas Mahuse.

Another representative of the Malind indigenous community, Sinta Gebze from Wanam Village, said the company entered their customary territory without the community’s permission, with a large military escort, which has made the community afraid to resist directly.

According to her, some residents have experienced violence from security forces. They were beaten, resulting in injuries, and some were even paralyzed.

“Furthermore, I experienced intimidation while at a place of worship. I was picked up at the church door. I asked them, ‘What did I do wrong? I was just defending my land rights,'” said Sinta Gebze.

He said the company’s activities continue day and night, and the indigenous people have been unable to stop the clearing of their forests and gardens.

“The community has been demanding compensation for the cleared crops since 2024, but there has been no response from the company,” said Sinta Gebze.

Another Malind indigenous community member, Simon Petrus Balagaize, said the project has also sparked social conflict among the indigenous people, as some accepted the company’s offer, while others refused. The conflict culminated in violence and the burning of the homes of residents who opposed the project.

“Initially, the project was carried out by PT Jhonlin Group, then by other companies, but these companies denied their involvement,” said Simon Petrus Balagaize.

He said that most of the Malind’s customary territory has now been divided into various company concessions. Of the approximately two million hectares of customary territory, the majority has been included in company concessions or designated as production forest areas.

“The last remaining forest is our habitat, along with cassowaries, birds-of-paradise, and many other animals. There’s also sago, our staple food,” he said.

The Malind indigenous people, according to Balagaize, do not oppose development. Instead, they want to be respected as owners of their customary land. For indigenous people, the forest is a living space that provides all their needs.

“For us, the forest is heaven; God has provided everything there. That’s why we defend our forest. Customary land does not belong to the village head, the traditional chief, or the government, but to the clan, passed down from generation to generation,” he said.

He stated that if any clan holding customary rights disagrees, the customary land cannot be relinquished. Balagaize called for solidarity and support for the Malind indigenous people’s struggle to defend their customary land and forest. (*)